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ABSTRACT
Although the idea that a violation of deeply held moral and ethical values can
result in a profound psychic, social and spiritual wounding is an ancient one, the
exploration of the phenomenon of moral injury in the field of mental health has only
recently gained traction. Moral injury is increasingly being regarded as its own
psychological phenomenon, one that shares symptomology with PTSD, but is also
distinct, and as yet not sufficiently accounted for in current PTSD criteria. This
theoretical thesis charts the evolving clinical construct of moral injury and draws on two
bodies of theory, narrative theory and adult onset trauma theory, to further explore the
psychic and social sequelae of war trauma. The work of the public health project Theater
of War, and the text of Sophocles’ Ajax are used as case examples to illustrate the
treatment implications for social work practice of applying narrative theory and adult
onset trauma to moral injury.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction

On a warm, late April evening this past spring, the actors Reg E. Cathey and Erica
Newhouse sat on folding chairs in front of an audience at Amherst College. On the table before
them were microphones, water bottles, and scripts of Sophocles’ Ajax. Standing to their side was
Bryan Doerries, the artistic director of Theater of War, a New York City-based social impact
company that presents dramatic readings of classical texts followed by town hall discussions in
order to raise awareness about the devastating effects of war on the human psyche. The
performance at Amherst was Theater of War’s 299th, and they have thus far reached over 40,000
military members and veterans around the country (Outside the Wire, 2015). The organization
considers itself a public health project and sees damming this country’s current flood of military
suicides, which has more than doubled since Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001, as part
of its mission (Outside the Wire, 2015; Bryan, Bryan, Morrow, Etienne, & Ray-Sannerud, 2014).
Before the reading began, Doerries set the contextual stage for the audience, explaining
that this was the tenth year of the Trojan War, and that Ajax, who would kill himself in the
second act of the play, had recently suffered grave betrayal at the hands of his commanding
officers. At issue: the armor of slain Achilles, the greatest of all Greek warriors, had been
bestowed upon Odysseus, rather than the more deserving Ajax. Reeling from the wound of nonrecognition, not to mention the mental disorganization of a decade of combat, Ajax, Doerries
told the audience, enters a berserk state and slaughters the animals in his compound, thinking
that they are Odysseus and his men. Doerries then took a seat at the table (he would be reading
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Odysseus’ lines) and Newhouse, instantly in character as Tecmessa, Ajax’s grief-stricken wife,
began to tell of Ajax’s carnage—both literal and psychological:
I can’t tell you what happened out there,
But he returned dragging tethered bulls,
Herdsmen’s dogs and captured sheep.
He slit the throats of some; others he hung up
And butchered cleaving them in two.
The rest were tied up and tortured
As if they were men, not livestock. …
Then suddenly he came storming back inside.
Slowly and painfully he returned to his senses.
And when he saw the carnage under his roof,
He grasped his head and screamed,
Crashing down onto the bloody wreckage,
Then just sitting in the slaughter, fists clenched,
His nails tearing into his hair. (Sophocles, 2007, 295-310)
For the next two hours, some of the nuances of what I see as Ajax’s moral injury—the
acts of betrayal and the acts of perpetration that can cause it; the states of shame, guilt, rage, and
suicidality that it can induce—were held aloft. Together, the audience, the actors, and Doerries
explored just how much a Greek tragedy written nearly twenty-five hundred years ago has to say
to us about the present-day experience of veterans and their families, be those veterans of the
Vietnam War or the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As just a brief example, Tecmessa’s
description of Ajax in a berserk state, slaughtering animals he believes are men, has an uncanny
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echo in the descriptions of the My Lai massacre that took place in Vietnam in 1968. Robert Jay
Lifton (1973), in his seminal work on the war, noted that some eyewitness accounts had
American troops
gunning down the Vietnamese with “no expression on . . . [their] faces . . .very
businesslike,” with “breaks for cigarettes or refreshments.” Yet others described
the men as having become “wild” or “crazy” in their killing, raping, and
destroying. The My Lai survivor described one GI engaging in a “mad chase”
after a pig, which he eventually bayoneted; and others in uncontrolled ways,
tossing grenades or firing powerful weapons into the fragile “hootches” that made
up the village. (p. 51)
The mechanism of dehumanization—or conditioning, as the American military calls it—
is what allows human beings to override their innate aversion to killing other human beings
(Milgram, 1974; Grossman, 2009; Smith, 2011). There is, of course, a continuum of acts
committed in war, ranging from the just to the atrocious. But whether a service member is
ordered to use deadly force to stop a teenager suspected of wearing a bomb from approaching a
military base, or witnesses the shrieking grief of an eight-year-old boy who has just seen his
mother shot in the face by American troops, or, in a moment of collective rage, terror, and
traumatic grief, as Lifton (1973) believes the troops at My Lai were propelled by, confuses pigs
with human beings and human beings with pigs, a fundamental transgression—a moral injury—
has occurred. “The telling truth,” notes the humanities scholar Robert Meagher (2014),
is that a great many combat veterans are haunted more by what they have done
than by what they have endured in war…. ‘Kicking ass’ does not include facing
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the possibility that all killing kills something in the killer and that, as a result,
there is no such thing as killing without dying. (p. xviii)
For thousands of years, writers, artists, philosophers, historians, and of course combat
veterans have recognized moral injury as a state of being, but only in the last five hundred years
have the psychological sequelae of war been explicitly named. According to Tick (2005), the
cluster of symptoms soldiers seemed to commonly experience post-battle were first diagnosed by
Swiss doctors in 1678 and called nostalgia. During the Civil War, the psychic effects of war
were referred to as soldiers’ heart, and in World War I as shell shock. In World War II and the
Korean War, soldiers were thought to suffer from combat fatigue, and in the post Vietnam-era,
the term posttraumatic stress was introduced. Now moral injury is being viewed as a valid and
valuable construct within the clinical scientific community and beyond (Litz et al., 2009; Nash &
Litz 2013; Morris, 2015). It is in the early stages of being operationalized—a complicated task,
given how individual and perhaps fundamentally unquantifiable moral injury may be (Vargas et
al. 2013; Kinghorn, 2012).
Jonathan Shay (1994, 2014), a psychiatrist who over the last twenty years has worked
extensively with Vietnam veterans and has authored two seminal texts on the subject, is credited
with first coining the phrase moral injury in the late 1990s and embedding it in the mental health
lexicon (Litz et al., 2009; Kinghorn; 2012; Nash & Litz 2013,). Shay’s most current (2014)
definition of moral injury is the following:


A betrayal of what’s right.



By someone who holds legitimate authority (e.g. the military—a leader).



In a high stakes situation.

All three. (p. 183)
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The Department of Veterans Affairs-based psychologist Brett Litz and his colleagues picked up
this understanding of moral injury in 2009 and have expanded the definition for service members
and veterans, offering additional nuance and empirically supported clinical texture to include the
idea that the betrayer of what’s right does not have to be “someone who holds authority” but can
also, devastatingly, be oneself. Nash & Litz (2013) state that moral injury can be seen as
the enduring consequences of perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to,
or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.
Central to the concept of moral injury is an event that is not only inconsistent with
previous moral expectations, but which has the power to negate them. Moral
injury is not merely a state of cognitive dissonance, but a state of loss of trust in
previously deeply held beliefs about one’s own or others’ ability to keep our
shared moral covenant. (p. 368)
Betrayal—by others or by oneself—is the common denominator of these two conceptions
of moral injury, and in each case, shame, guilt, and self-destructive behaviors are the signature
after-effects. The broader scope of symptomology includes social withdrawal, anger, anhedonia
and dysphoria, avoidance, change or loss in spirituality and/or meaning in life, and negative
changes in ethical attitudes and behavior (Drescher et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2012; Nash & Litz,
2013; Bryan et al., 2014). It is worth noting that in the moral injury model that Nash & Litz
(2013) have put forth,
intense anger and impulses to seek revenge are central in moral injuries resulting
from others’ acts or failures to act that seem to violate communally shared moral
values, and these emotions and cognitions are maintained through an inability to
forgive perceived perpetrators. (p. 369)
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We are thus back to Ajax and his particular feedback loop of moral injury: vengeful, homicidal
rage toward Odysseus, which leads to unsurvivable shame and guilt.
On September 20th, 2015, The New York Times ran a front page story entitled “A Unit
Stalked by Suicide, Trying to Save Itself,” in which the reporter, David Philipps, describes the
post-deployment death and despair encountered by veterans of the Second Battalion, Seventh
Marine Regiment, who served a harrowing, combat-filled stint in Afghanistan in 2008. As
Philipps reports, of the 1,200 Marines who were there in 2008, at least 13 have since committed
suicide. In addition to detailing the lack of adequate mental health care from the Department of
Veterans Affairs, Philipps, through the voices of the Marines, evokes the often lethal psychic
collapse that occurs for those who have killed or seen others killed in combat—and outlines just
how intractable a crisis this has proven to be. As Philipps notes,
For years leaders at the top level of the government have acknowledged the high
suicide rate among veterans and spent heavily to try to reduce it. But the suicides
have continued, and basic questions about who is most at risk and how best to
help them are still largely unanswered. (Philipps, 2015)
This thesis takes as its starting point the reality that the psychological state of our recent
combat veterans is dire. Because clinical social workers are often on the front lines of psychic
defense for these men and women, it is urgent that we continue to research, to theorize, and to
disseminate information about war trauma. The evolving construct of moral injury is, in my
mind, a highly worthy attempt to do just that. Since Litz et al.’s (2009) call to operationalize
moral injury, a growing number of psychologists (many based at the Department of Veterans
Affairs and grounded in cognitive behavorial theory) have responded to that challenge. This
thesis will review their contributions. I will begin by laying out some of the current factors that
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have brought the urgency of understanding and conceptualizing moral injury to the fore, and
chart some of the key ways in which it has evolved from past conceptualizations of posttraumatic stress disorder. In reviewing the clinical literature, I will offer more detailed
descriptions of the primary causal and resultant mechanisms of moral injury—perpetration, guilt,
and shame—as well as describe some of the burgeoning models for moral repair.
I will apply concepts of narrative theory and practice from the work of Michael White in
order to better understand the dominant—and psychically damaging—storylines that exist
around war and veterans. I will also apply concepts of adult onset trauma theory from the work
of Ghislaine Boulanger in order to better understand the unconscious processes and
psychodynamic implications of moral injury. Because Theater of War’s public health project
functions as an iteration of narrative practice, this thesis will also specifically consider the
treatment implications of Theater of War for moral injury, as well as the clinical revelations that
Sophocles’ Ajax offers with regard to the moral injury construct.
Narrative theory and practice, which developed out of various disciplines, including
anthropology, sociology, and social psychology, take as their starting point the notion that human
beings create narratives to make sense of their lives, narratives that are constitutive of
experience. From a narrative perspective, human beings are often over-influenced by dominant
narratives and lose touch with—or are never permitted to recognize in the first place—
alternative, de-pathologizing storylines that are more in keeping with their actual lived
experience. Narrative practice, which takes a de-centered approach, seeks to aid people in
locating their own preferred narratives through uncovering and thereby externalizing dominant
historical, social, and intra-personal narratives. As White (2007) notes, such externalizing allows
for “objectification of the problem against cultural practices of objectification of people” (p. 9).
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Narrative theory and practice is particularly well-suited to social work practice as it is a mode of
therapeutic inquiry that seeks to uncover the “politics of the problem…the power relations that
people have been subject to and that have shaped their negative conclusions about their life and
their identity” (p. 27). It is a therapeutic practice that is always highly attuned to the forces in
society that dominate, discriminate, and exploit.
Adult onset trauma theory, which the psychoanalyst and scholar Ghislaine Boulanger,
formulates in her book, Wounded by Reality (2009), is located within a relational framework and
offers a compelling perspective on what happens to the adult self when it is confronted with
catastrophic trauma. According to Boulanger, such trauma shatters the self’s ability to reflect,
symbolize, connect to a sense of a historic self, and retain access to internal and external others.
Her theory is particularly concerned with the crucial distinctions in the dissociative processes
between adult onset trauma and developmental trauma, and the further injury that can occur
when these distinctions are conflated or misunderstood. Her understanding of adult onset trauma
has valuable implications for the treatment of individuals experiencing moral injury. Not only
does it delineate the sequelae of the shattering of an adult self and challenge long-held
psychoanalytic notions about “the durability of psychic structure” (p. 12), but it also breaks from
the classical psychoanalytic tendency to view adult reactions to external events as driven
exclusively by the individual’s developmental history and particular object relations. Boulanger
takes issue with the notion that the adult survivor of adult onset-trauma can be reduced only to
“psychic infancy” (p. 96). Instead, she gives deserved weight to the reality of the catastrophic
event(s) encountered in adulthood, a crucial stance for social workers confronted with moral
injury and the particular horrors of war.
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At the same time, Boulanger conceives of adult onset trauma theory from within a
relational framework—she does not throw out the baby, so to speak, with the bathwater—and I
also believe it is crucial to examine moral injury from a psychodynamic perspective, to conceive
of it in relation to our conscious and unconscious processes, to our methods of psychic defense,
and to our object relations with self and other. Finally, adult onset trauma theory offers a useful
counterpoint to the cognitive behavioral orientation of most of the moral injury construct
builders in the clinical scientific community, and thus provides additional intellectual space in
which to conceptualize moral injury and consider how best to treat it.

Conclusion
Philip Klay, a veteran of the war in Iraq and the author of Redeployment, a National Book
Award-winning collection of stories, made a plea last year in a New York Times opinion piece for
there to be a greater willingness in this country to enter into a collective conversation about the
psychic costs of war:
If we fetishize trauma as incommunicable then survivors are trapped — unable to
feel truly known by their nonmilitary friends and family. . . . If the past 10 years
have taught us anything, it’s that in the age of an all-volunteer military, it is far
too easy for Americans to send soldiers on deployment after deployment without
making a serious effort to imagine what that means. (Klay, 2014)
The aim of this thesis is to present a picture of moral injury as it is currently being
constructed by the clinical scientific community, and to then both enhance and complicate this
picture by examining the phenomenon of moral injury through the lenses of narrative theory and
adult onset trauma theory. Like Klay, I want to broaden the ways in which the trauma of war can
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be communicated. I see the current moral injury construct as one form of communication; I see
Theater of War’s readings of Ajax as another, and I see a psychodynamic understanding of what
happens to a person’s mind when he or she is faced with the reality of human beings killing other
human beings as yet another. None of these modes of communication are incompatible with the
others, and indeed, finding lines of connection between cognitive behavioral theory and
psychodynamic theory, between theater and social work, between ancient literature and present
day military experience—not to mention between civilians and service members—is crucial to
this endeavor. I should add too that finding ways to communicate the incommunicable is
different from absolute knowing. I, as a civilian social worker, will never fully know what it is
like to experience war trauma. But I can listen, and in true listening there is true communication,
and therefore true human recognition. As the Norwegian social psychiatrist Tom Anderson once
wrote, “to listen is also to see” (p. 121).
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CHAPTER II
The Phenomenon of Moral Injury

Why me? Why me?
—Sophocles, Ajax
Early on, before they’d seen any real action, Billy asked him what being in a
firefight was like. Shroom thought for a moment. “It’s not like anything, except
maybe being raped by angels.” He’d say, “I love you” to every man in the squad
before rolling out, say it straight, with no joking or smart-ass lilt and no warbly
Christian smarm in it either, just that brisk declaration like he was tightening the
seat belts around everyone’s soul.
—Ben Fountain, Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk.

The Stakes
Over two and a half million service members have deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq
since 2001, and their acute psychological needs have given rise to a fresh awareness within the
government as well as within the fields of mental health to the ways in which warfare damages
minds (RAND, 2015; Sherman, 2015).
This damage is thought to be compounded by the nature of our recent conflicts in the
Middle East: counterinsurgency and urban guerrilla warfare may be especially conducive to
producing traumatic, morally injurious situations due to their unconventional aspects, such as the
difficulty of differentiating civilians from combatants (Litz et al., 2009). What’s more, the
multiple deployments that are required of a voluntary military—less than one percent of the
American population has served in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—are exponentially taxing
the emotional well-being of service members and families who must then navigate multiple
disruptions, losses, and sacrifices (Meagher, 2014). Indeed, as Litz et al. (2009) point out,
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deployment length has been correlated with an increase in unethical behaviors within the first ten
months of deployment.
The suffering is undeniable. The Department of Veteran Affairs estimates that roughly
8,000 veterans kill themselves a year, which translates to a rate of about twenty-two per day—or
one every 65 minutes (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2012, as cited in Doerries, 2015, p. 4).
According to Nazarov et al. (2015), while sixty percent of all veterans committing suicide are
fifty years of age or older—a reflection of how much of the overall veteran population is
represented by those who served in Vietnam or Korea—in 2012, the most common cause of
death in personnel who were currently serving in the US military was not combat (311 deaths)
but suicide (349 deaths and 915 attempts). Since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began fourteen
years ago, the number of suicides among active duty personnel has doubled (Nazarov et al.,
2015; Kinghorn, 2012; U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2012; U.S. Department of Defense,
2011).
Roughly twenty percent of service members coming home from the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan meet the criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and thus suffer from a
debilitating symptomology that includes flashbacks, intrusive memories, nightmares, emotional
and inter-relational avoidance, isolating, anger, hypervigilance, self-destructive behaviors,
especially substance abuse, and negative alterations in cognition and mood (Nazarov et al., 2015,
Department of Veterans Affairs 2015; DSM-5, 2013; Kinghorn, 2012; Rauch et al., 2010). While
PTSD is the most prominent diagnosis among returning troops, there is also, as Rauch et al.
(2010) note, a clear association with anxiety, depression (as cited by Hoge et al., 2004),
substance abuse (as cited by Jacobson et al. 2008), physical health problems (as cited by
Gironda, Clark, & Walker, 2005 and Hoge et al., 2007), aggression (as cited by Jacupac et al.,
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2007), risk-taking behavior (as cited by Killgore et al., 2008), and suicide (as cited by Kuehn,
2009).
In an attempt to mitigate this mental health crisis, the federal government has directed a
vast amount of funds towards understanding the etiology and treatment of PTSD: in 2012 alone,
it spent three billion dollars on PTSD treatments (Nash & Litz, 2013; Morris, 2015). The
Department of Veterans Affairs has two “gold-standard” evidence-based treatments (EBT) that it
puts forward for anyone with a diagnosis of PTSD: Prolonged Exposure (PE) and Cognitive
Processing Therapy (CPT) (Nash & Litz, 2013; Department of Veterans Affairs, 2015). And yet,
with the number of combat veterans diagnosed with PTSD ever growing, it is becoming
increasingly clear that these two widely used and heralded treatments are not sufficient. As
Steenkamp & Litz (2014) recently stated, “individual CPT and PE work in that they reduce
military-related PTSD symptoms. However, it is less clear whether PE and CPT work well, that
is, decrease symptoms to the point of low impairment and distress. Across studies at least half of,
but typically most veterans still meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD following treatment” (p. 706).
While a comprehensive review of the etiology of PTSD is beyond the scope of this thesis,
it will nonetheless be useful to contextualize its evolution within the field of trauma studies and
the recent changes in its diagnostic criteria, so that we may better understand why moral injury is
increasingly being regarded as its own psychological phenomenon, one that crucially shares
symptomology with PTSD, but is also distinct and as yet not sufficiently accounted for in current
PTSD criteria. As proponents of the moral injury construct argue, this lack of fit of moral injury
within standard PTSD criteria accounts for precisely why PTSD treatments designed without a
clear conception of moral injury are failing to reduce symptoms for so many combat veterans
(Gray et al., 2012; Kinghorn, 2012; Steenkamp & Litz, 2013).
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Posttraumatic stress disorder
PTSD was officially introduced as a psychiatric diagnosis in the DSM-III in 1980 (APA),
marking a crucial paradigm shift in the field of mental health by sanctioning the belief that the
stressor for the experienced psychic anguish and symptomology existed outside the person—i.e.,
in the form of a traumatic event, like a car accident, a rape, a natural disaster or combat—rather
than inside the person, in the form of an intrapsychic neurosis. With this first official iteration,
PTSD was categorized as an anxiety disorder, and the criteria indicated that the external
traumatic event needed to be directly life threatening. That external event—the index trauma—
would then come to dominate the consciousness of survivors, as they entered a cycle of reexperiencing via nightmares, intrusive thoughts, and full-blown sensory flashbacks, and found
themselves unable to experience pleasure or vitality in their present life (van der Kolk & van der
Hart, 1991; van der Kolk, 2003; Department of Veterans Affairs, 2015). Indeed, the concerns
and attachments of present life—along with the concerns and attachments of family members
and friends—can fade frighteningly in the face of what Boulanger (2007) calls “the momentous
and very private experiences” the survivor is continually reliving (p. 7).
The idea of external traumatic events returning to the trauma survivor in this way was not
new. As van der Kolk (2003) delineates, in one extraordinarily trauma-attuned decade at the end
of the nineteenth century, first Charcot (1887), then Janet (1919), and finally Freud (1925)
explored the metabolization (or lack thereof) of trauma, pinpointing the processes of
dissociation, unbidden re-experiencing, and fragmentation of memory that today are integral
parts of our understanding of trauma. Freud then famously came to disavow the reality of his
patients’ experiences of trauma, turning psychoanalysis toward the intrapsychic. At that point, as
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van der Kolk (2003) succinctly puts it, “Real-life trauma was ignored in favor of fantasy” (p.
176).
Through the process of what Herman (1992) calls “episodic amnesia” (p. 7), the study of
trauma was largely ignored after Freud’s reversal until the beginning of World War II, when
Kardner (1941), in an account of the experience of treating World War I veterans, wrote that
[the] subject acts as if the original traumatic situation were still in existence and
engages in protective devices which failed on the original occasion. This means in
effect that his conception of the outer world and his conception of himself have
been permanently altered. (p. 82; emphasis added)
After World War II the study of trauma was again split off, like a dissociated self state, from the
core self of psychoanalysis, and did not reemerge again until the psychic suffering of Vietnam
veterans reached a saturation point in the early 1970s and the American public had no choice but
to listen to their stories and reconsider the way they were seen, heard, and treated (Herman,
1992; van der Kolk, 2003). As an intern at the Department of Veteran Affairs this past year, I sat
in on a Vietnam Veterans’ support group and had the privilege of witnessing the pride and sense
of agency a number of these veterans had for the key role that Vietnam veterans played in
advocating for the inclusion of PTSD as we now know it in the DSM—and their awareness of
how much recent veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan have benefited as a result. Understandably,
this pride was accompanied by bitterness and anger, for there was no such diagnosis available for
them when they came home.
The psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton (1973) was a key figure in raising national awareness
of the trauma experienced by Vietnam veterans and can also be considered an early architect of
the currently evolving construct of moral injury. While he did not use that term, he wrote
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extensively on the sequelae of combat experiences, particularly the effect that killing in combat
could have on an individual’s psychic landscape. He was also interested in the emotional and
contextual elements that could line up to create what he called “atrocity producing situations” (p.
41) whereby “one had to be a bit exceptional or, in that situation, ‘abnormal,’ in order to avoid
taking part in slaughter” (p. 57).
Renewed interest in trauma stemming from the Vietnam War, the women’s movement,
and the relational turn in psychoanalysis—which rigorously addressed the realities of sexual
abuse in childhood (Herman, 1992; Davies & Frawley, 1994; Bromberg, 1998; Boulanger
2007)—resulted in a wave of research on the interplay of attachment and neurobiology with
trauma. According to van der Kolk (2003), PTSD has since come to be regarded as a
“physioneurosis”: a “mental disorder based on the persistence of biological emergency
responses” (p. 177). Research has demonstrated how traumatic experiences can impact the
regulatory and integrative capacities of brain function—namely the brain stem and
hypothalamus, the limbic system, and the neocortex—and decrease the brain’s capacity to
respond adaptively to external events (Siegel & Solomon, 2003). It appears that permanent
neural changes can occur when the central nervous system is overly stimulated at the time of the
trauma, thus impacting a person’s ability to evaluate future stimuli; the smell of burning toast,
for example, may trigger an emergency physiological response that would in actuality be
appropriate if the entire house were on fire (van der Kolk, 2003). This same difficulty with
processes of categorization may account for the way in which entire episodes of traumatic
experience are held in the mind: not in a narrative fashion, but rather in sensory-loaded
fragments. As van der Kolk (2003) notes,

16

While most patients with PTSD construct a narrative of their trauma over time, it
is characteristic of PTSD that sensory elements of the trauma itself continue to
intrude as flashbacks and nightmares, altered states of consciousness in which the
trauma is relived, unintegrated with an overall sense of self. Because traumatic
memories are so fragmented, it seems reasonable to postulate that extreme
emotional arousal leads to a failure of the central nervous system to synthesize the
sensations related to the trauma into an integrated whole. (p. 180)
The relevance of human attachment systems to trauma was first made manifest in Judith
Herman’s conception of “complex posttraumatic disorders” (Herman, 1992). According to
Herman, individuals who suffer repeated traumas at a developmentally vulnerable stage—i.e., in
early childhood or adolescence, when the brain is undergoing significant neurological changes—
experience an array of aftereffects. As Courtois & Ford (2009) point out,
identifying complex trauma as a distinct subset of psychological traumas provides
the clinician and researcher with a basis for identifying individuals who have
experienced not only the shock of extreme fear, helplessness, and horror but also
disruption of the emergent capacity for psychobiological self-regulation and
secure attachment. In addition to hyperarousal and hypervigilance in relation to
external danger, complex trauma poses for the person the internal threat of being
unable to self-regulate, self-organize, or draw upon relationships to regain selfintegrity. (p. 17)
Although complex PTSD was rejected as a separate diagnosis in the DSM IV, it has, in
multiple and ongoing ways, expanded the clinical understanding of trauma and inspired
clinicians and researchers to more rigorously consider the impact of chronicity—on a child who
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is sexually abused over a period of years, for example, or on the effects of ‘cumulative adversity’
due to poverty, racism, genocide, intellectual disabilities, sexual harassment/assault in the work
place, or exposure to suffering or death (Courtois & Ford, 2009; Vogt, King, & King, 2007).
Along with looking at the salient effects of chronicity, researchers have also paid particular
attention to the effects of closeness, i.e., the relational position of the trauma survivor to the
person or entity that was traumatizing. Courtois & Ford (2009) state:
The closer the relationship between perpetrators(s) and victim(s) and their group
(e.g., in a family, religion, gender, political party, institution, chain of command),
the more likely they are to face conditions of divided loyalty. As a self-protective
strategy, the group may coalesce around silencing, secrecy, and denial…. This
circumstance has been labeled the second injury (Symonds, 1975) or betrayal
trauma (DePrince and Freyd, 2007). (p. 18)
The thirteen years between the DSM-IV-TR (2000) and the DSM-5 (2013) saw much
debate as to how trauma should be diagnosed and treated and what the core criteria of PTSD
should ultimately be (Jones & Cureton 2014). The current definition of PTSD in the DSM-5
(2013) incorporates some of the ideas that are contained within the various formulations and
comorbidities of complex PTSD and makes some notable revisions, although it arguably still
does not fully do justice to the nuances of complex PTSD. Most importantly, PTSD is no longer
in the category of Anxiety Disorders, but now serves as the foundational diagnosis of the new
Trauma-and-Stressor-Related category. Criterion A for a diagnosis is exposure to actual or
threatened death, serious injury, or (this is newly included) sexual violence. Recurrent exposure
to traumatic events and/or details, also known as vicarious traumatization, is also newly
included. Greater emphasis has been placed on the phenomenon of avoidance in relation to
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PTSD, such that it now has its own cluster of symptomology. The four clusters are: intrusion,
avoidance, negative alterations in cognition and mood, and negative alterations in arousal and
reactivity. Three new symptoms were also included: persistent or distorted blame of self or
others, a persistent negative emotional state, and reckless or destructive behavior (Department of
Veterans Affairs, 2015). These new symptoms have important ramifications for expanding the
diagnosis to include individuals—like combat veterans suffering moral injury—whose primary
response in the face of a traumatic experience may not just be fear, helplessness, or horror, but
also guilt, shame, or numbness (Jones & Cureton, 2014).
Despite such amendments to the definition of PTSD in the DSM-5, Jones & Cureton
(2014), in reviewing the extant literature, are not convinced that the current diagnosis of PTSD
sufficiently describes the array of symptomology experienced by early childhood survivors of
abuse (Herman, 1992; van der Kolk, 2003, van der Kolk et al., 2005). Moreover, as previously
mentioned, a growing number of researchers do not find that it fully encompasses the
symptomology of some combat veterans, insofar as the DSM-5 continues to dictate that the
stressor event must be one that invokes a fear response (Nash & Litz, 2013). Fear as a primary
causal agent of PTSD (and therefore fear as the primary response to be extinguished through
treatment) is what much of the recent research on moral injury calls into question (Gray et al.,
2012).
In conclusion, it is worth underscoring how conceptualizations of PTSD have been
marked by a kind of theoretical seismic activity: by reversals, by abandonment, and by
disagreement. Citing Brewin, Lanius, Novac, Schnyder, & Galea (2009), Jones & Cureton
(2014) state that “with the exception of dissociative identity disorder, no other diagnostic
condition in the history of the DSM has created more controversy about boundaries of the
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condition, symptomological profile, central assumptions, clinical utility and prevalence than
PTSD.” Nash & Litz (2009) also take note of the ongoing confusion around the criteria for
PTSD. “Despite more than three decades of research and multiple revisions of the diagnostic
criteria for PTSD,” they write, “it remains unclear what stressor types are capable of inducing
posttraumatic stress symptoms, and how directly and immediately they must be experienced” (p.
367).
Indeed, in a post 9/11 era, the very phenomenon of PTSD can seem increasingly difficult
to ground and examine. On the one hand, there is the clinical conceptualization of this disorder;
on the other, there is the culture’s incorporation of it. PTSD is everywhere. At a recent forum at
Smith College, Edward Tick (2015) called it, only half-jokingly, “posttraumatic societal
disorder.” His meaning is that, at least with regard to combat veterans, our culture does an
exceedingly poor job of recognizing and healing the after-effects of war; the problem, he
believes, is less with veteran symptomology than with a society that cannot look directly at what
it sanctions. According to the journalist and combat veteran David Morris (2014),
We live now in an aftermath culture, a culture where being traumatized is
presumed to be the appropriate response to just about any overwhelming event….
[PTSD] has become a sort of global lingua franca, a label, an identity, a way of
understanding the self, a cultural meme, a political interest group, a scientific
mythology, and even a theory of time. (p. 15; p. 20)
Part of what is driving the current proponents of moral injury—and accounts for the undeniable
energy and sense of urgency in this field of research—is the need to section off moral injury, to
pull the bio-psycho-social sequelae of combat away from a generalized, diluted, even
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stereotypical understanding of PTSD and into the realm of the specific, where authentic
understanding and repair can flourish.

Defining the Moral Injury Construct
Shay (1994), as noted, is credited with having initiated the current conversation on moral
injury. In Achilles in Vietnam, he compares the trials of Homer’s warriors to the experiences of
Vietnam veterans and challenges the notion that veterans suffer from a post-traumatic disorder.
The psychological after-effects of combat, he insists, should not be viewed as a disorder, but
rather as moral injury, as real as a leg amputation, and as such should move away from the
pathological. Shay (1994) is openly indebted to Herman’s (1992) formulations of trauma, and
comes to the conclusion that experiencing a “betrayal of what’s right” by those in command is
the key precipitant for a soldier enduring lasting psychological wounds, in part because of the
way that such betrayals mimic developmental betrayals and victimizations. The social trust that
is destroyed by such a breach, Shay (1994) theorizes, creates a persistence of combat-readiness
(i.e., hypervigilance), betrayal (which he sees evidence of in the high rates of homelessness of
Vietnam veterans), isolation (destroyed trust in others), a sense of meaninglessness, and
suicidality (169-80).
In 2005, Ed Tick helped to alert the mental health community to the ways in which PTSD
as an all-encompassing diagnosis was failing veterans. In particular, he called attention to the
“soul wound” (p. 7) of many combat soldiers and lamented the absence of cultural rituals for
returning veterans, who, he believes, need the community’s support to make the transition from
veteran to warrior in order to heal. While he does not use the term moral injury, that is
nonetheless precisely what he is talking about. After a decade of treating veterans through
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conventional models of therapy and witnessing little true improvement, Tick turned to the rituals
of past cultures and explored the benefits of alternative methods of healing, including
“purification, storytelling, healing journeys, grieving rituals, meetings with former enemies, soul
retrieval, initiation ceremonies, and the creation and nurturing of a warrior class” (p. 5). The
pathway to healing, he came to believe, “must deal with our moral and spiritual dimensions” (p.
6).
Four years later, Litz et al.’s (2009) empirically supported theoretical study was
published, and true operationalization of moral injury began. Because of this multifaceted
study’s influence in paving the way for moral injury to be considered a legitimate clinical
construct—one worthy of government funding—I will spend some time outlining it.
Litz et al. (2009) begin by theorizing what might be morally injurious in war and
identifying some of the primary morally questionable situations that can arise for combat
soldiers, e.g., accidentally taking the life of a civilian, being directly responsible for killing an
enemy, viewing dead bodies or human remains, and the viewing of injured or distraught women
or children whom a soldier is powerless to help. In order to highlight the grave psychic
consequences of perpetration, Litz et al. (2009) then provide an overview of the extant research
on mental health in the aftermath of military atrocities, which they define as “unnecessary, cruel,
and abusive harm to others or lethal violence and killing” (p. 697). The salient points drawn from
this body of research are worth summarizing:
1. For Vietnam veterans with chronic PTSD, the connection between
committing an atrocity and suffering from PTSD was much stronger than from
simply participating in combat (as cited in Yehuda, Southwick, & Giller, 1992;
Fontana et al., 1992).
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2. Exposure to atrocities correlates with a higher risk of depression and
suicidality (as cited in Hiley-Young, Blake, Abueg, Rozynko, & Gusman, 1995).
3. Killing in any situation (i.e. committing an atrocity or killing under basic
orders and/or self defense) is more highly associated with chronic PTSD than other
combat experiences (as cited in Fontana & Rosenheck, 1999; MacNair, 2002).
4. Among Iraq War veterans, taking another life is a significant predictor of
PTSD symptoms, alcohol abuse, anger, and relationship difficulties (as cited in
Maguen et al., 2010).
5. Veterans with greater levels of combat exposure are more likely to seek
services from the VA because of guilt and loss of faith rather than PTSD or lack of
social support (as cited in Fontana & Rosenheck, 2004).
6. Active roles related to killing (defined as being an agent or failing to
prevent killing) point to greater PTSD and suicide than other more passive roles
(as cited in Fontana et al., 1992).
Litz et al. (2009) conclude, on the basis of this research literature, that perpetration—killing or
committing atrocities—is clearly linked to elevated levels of distress and avoidance symptoms.
Litz et al. (2009) then establish the schema-driven social-cognitive foundation upon
which they are building their moral injury construct:
Similar to social-cognitive theories of PTSD, we argue that moral injury involves
an act of transgression that creates dissonance and conflict because it violates
assumptions and beliefs about right and wrong and personal goodness. If
individuals are unable to assimilate or accommodate (integrate) the event within
existing self-and-relational schemas, they will experience guilt, shame, and
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anxiety about potential dire personal consequences (e.g., ostracization). Poor
integration leads to lingering psychological distress, due to frequent intrusions,
and avoidance behaviors tend to thwart successful accommodation. (p. 698)
In defining the basic concepts necessary for a formulation of moral injury, Litz et al. (2009) cite
morals, moral emotions, and self-forgiveness. They define morals as “the personal and shared
familial, cultural, societal and legal rules for social behavior, either tacit or explicit,” and as
“fundamental assumptions about how things work and how one should behave in the world” (p.
699). Moral emotions, they state are “both self-focused and other-focused, [and] serve to
maintain a moral code. Morality-related emotions are driven by expectations of others’ responses
to perceived transgression” (p. 699).
As they note, the bulk of research on negative moral emotions has thus far focused on
shame and guilt, and clearly suggests that shame, which involves a wholesale condemnation of
the self, is more destructive than guilt, which primarily involves self-condemnation in relation to
a specific act or transgression (Tangney and Dearing, 2002). (A more in-depth discussion of the
role of shame and guilt in moral injury will follow.)
After defining these basic concepts, Litz et al. (2009) are then able to fully present their
conceptual model of moral injury, which, as previously mentioned, they see as the direct result of
committing, failing to prevent, witnessing, or learning about acts that violate deeply held moral
beliefs. They state, “If the service members feel remorse about various behaviors, they will
experience guilt; if they blame themselves because of perceived personal inadequacy and flaws,
they will experience shame” (p. 700). Both of these emotions, but shame especially, can lead to
withdrawal and “concealment,” which will preempt opportunities to shift these new schemas
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about the self and thus draw the service member farther and farther away from the possibility of
“corrective” experiences and self-forgiveness (p. 700).
In further assessing the relation of moral injury to PTSD, Litz et al. (2009) note the ways
in which moral injury mirrors the symptoms of reexperiencing, avoidance, and emotional
numbing that are at the heart of PTSD. They argue that the drive to make sense of the dissonant
morally injurious experience leads to intrusive thoughts of the event(s) and that this reexperiencing then leads to diminished self esteem, which leads in turn to numbing and avoidance
behaviors, thereby foreclosing the opportunity for reaffirming experiences with others that might
interrupt this feedback loop. They note that the most damaging outcome of moral injury is the
“possibility of enduring changes in self and other beliefs that reflect regressive overaccommodation of moral violation, culpability, or expectations of injustice” (p. 701).
But they emphasize that current formulations of PTSD do not fully explain the evolution
and after-effects of moral injury. In their view, theories of PTSD “attempt to explain the longterm phenomenology of individuals harmed by others (and other unpredictable, uncontrollable,
and threatening circumstances and have not considered the potential harm produced by
perpetration (and moral transgressions) in traumatic contexts” (p. 699). In order to effect any
type of repair, they argue, the moral emotions that follow acts of perpetration—shame and
guilt—need to be exposed and then adjusted through self-forgiveness. They conclude by offering
a preliminary eight-step cognitive-behavioral-based clinical care model and by exhorting fellow
researchers to take a multi-disciplinary approach to further construction of moral injury,
specifically along psychometric lines, with measures of operational exposures and trials of
interventions.
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Validating the Moral Injury Construct
With the goal of qualitative construct building, Drescher et al. (2011) gathered a diverse
group of 23 chaplains, mental health clinicians, and researchers who had worked with combat
and veteran populations for many years and used a semi-structured interview to evaluate the need
for a working definition of moral injury. The unequivocal consensus was threefold: that morally
injurious experiences did indeed occur in war, that these experiences could cause a variety of
long-term psycho-spiritual-social-behavioral difficulties, and that the construct of moral injury
was not sufficiently contained within PTSD criteria. Key areas of potentially morally injurious
events were identified and have been used as the primary categories for morally injurious
experiences in the literature since. These are betrayal (by leaders, peers, trusted civilians, or by
oneself), disproportionate violence, incidents involving civilians, and within-ranks violence. The
authors concluded by cautioning that before further quantitative research or clinical trials could
move forward, the field needed to create a scale that could reliably and validly measure moral
injury.
Nash et al. (2013) devised the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES) and administered it to
533 active duty Marines following combat deployment. The scale used a Likert-type response
option to gauge responses to nine items split into factors of 1) perceived transgressions by self or
other, and 2) perceived betrayal of an other. The nine items are as follows: witnessing of acts of
commission, distress resulting from others’ acts of commission, perpetration of acts of
commission, distress due to acts of commission, perpetration of acts of omission, distress due to
acts of omission, perceived betrayal by leaders, perceived betrayal by fellow service members,
perceived betrayal by nonmilitary others. Nash et al. (2013) proceeded to rigorously test the scale
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by evaluating its internal reliability, its psychometric properties, and its temporal stability, as
well as by cross-validating the two-factor structure. They found that the MIES had “excellent
internal consistency” and demonstrated temporal stability, and concluded that while further
evaluation of the MIES with other branches of the military and with both genders was indicated,
it was “a conceptually valid and psychometrically sound measure” (650). In further support of
the moral injury model, Nash et al. (2013) found with the MIES scale that exposure to potentially
morally injurious situations among these Marines correlated positively with depression, anxiety,
and PTSD symptoms, and negatively with perceived interpersonal support.
Bryan et al. (2013) performed a psychometric evaluation of the MIES that resulted in
further categorical clarity of the transgressions factors for moral injury: Transgressions-Self (i.e.,
acting in ways that violate one’s moral values), Transgressions-Other (i.e., witnessing others
acting in ways that violate one’s moral code), and Betrayal. They found that Transgressions-Self
overlapped the most with PTSD symptomology and that Transgressions-Self and TransgressionsOther were “moderately associated with pessimism and hopelessness” (p. 155). They did not find
that the Betrayal scale was significantly associated with current measures of psychological
distress.
In an effort to cement construct validity, Vargas et al. (2013) reviewed narrative
responses from the National Vietnam Veterans’ Readjustment study in order to corroborate
causal events and symptoms of moral injury with older primary source material and found that
there was significant overlap. One important difference they noted was that there was a
heightened corroboration of “Loss of Trust” themes with the Vietnam veteran sample as
compared to Drescher et al.’s (2011) findings with Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, suggesting
that there may have been particular elements of the Vietnam war that generated a greater sense of

27

betrayal for its veterans. Several other studies explored the impact of moral injury on populations
other than combat veterans: Gibbons et al. (2013), for example, performed a narrative analysis to
look at how combat-deployed nurses and physicians incorporate morally injurious experiences
and Dombo et al. (2013) applied Litz et al.’s (2009) model of moral injury to three civilian cases
in order to distinguish it from PTSD.
Nash & Litz’s (2013) oft-referenced theoretical study of moral injury as a “mechanism
for deployment-related psychological trauma in military spouses and children” (p. 366) offered
the most extensive model of moral injury to date (by utilizing the supportive research of
Drescher et al., 2011 and Nash et al., 2013) and further made the case for moral injury being
distinct from PTSD. They argue that because moral development is ideally a gradual process—a
five-year-old child is usually not confronted with the hard fact of death or the human capacity for
extreme violence—and because moral development is not experienced in isolation but always
relationally, it can additionally be viewed as the result of a challenge to a moral belief system
that is not developmentally or situationally prepared to incorporate it. They state that “[t]he
relative toxicity of potentially morally injurious events may correlate not only with how violently
they appear to contradict existing moral schemas, but also the extent to which they compromise
the ability of existing social and spiritual supports to maintain a secure holding environment” (p.
370).
With this model of moral injury in mind, they propose that military spouses and children
are vulnerable to moral injury directly through the news or stories shared by family members,
churches, and schools, and indirectly “through actions or failures to act, perceived to be
committed by members of one’s moral covenant, including family members, teachers,
community leaders, a deity, or oneself” (p. 370). A child, for example, may experience indirect
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moral injury as a result of an adult’s emotional withdrawal, self-destructive behavior, or suicide.
Additionally, they argue, “Community leaders, most especially those in the military, may be
agents of indirect wartime moral injury through their perceived failures to honor their
commitment to service members, veterans, and their families” (p. 371).
Again, as with a good portion of the clinical scientific moral injury research to date, a
driving force here is the need to separate moral injury from PTSD and to lend more weight to the
notion that events may be traumatic and morally injurious even when they are not directly life- or
safety-threatening.

Expanding Research on Perpetration, Guilt, and Shame
In the wake of Litz et al.’s (2009) working definition of moral injury, the effort to
generate more empirically based research on the mechanism of perpetration in relation to moral
injury became a priority in the field. Partly because a substantial body of research already existed
on the psychologically deleterious effects of killing and abusive violence (Grossman, 2009,
Beckham, Feldman, & Kirby, 1998; MacNair, 2002), several publications have already resulted
from this effort. In the first study to look at the impact of killing on veterans of the recent
conflicts, Maguen et al. (2012) found that the impact of killing on suicidal ideation was mediated
by depression and PTSD symptoms, and that the impact of killing on the desire for self-harm
was mediated by PTSD. In 2013, Maguen et al. designed a latent class analysis with Iraq and
Afghanistan veterans to determine whether those who killed in war were at risk for being the
most symptomatic for PTSD. While the findings were limited in that they were retrospective and
cross-sectional, they nonetheless demonstrated that those who killed were twice as likely to have
the most symptoms of PTSD. In addition, those who killed a civilian or killed in the context of
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anger or revenge were more likely to belong to the most symptomatic PTSD group than those
who did not kill.
Craig Bryan and his colleagues performed two important studies that looked in different
ways at the relationship between severe combat trauma and self-injurious thoughts and
behaviors. In Bryan, Ray-Sannerud, Morrow, and Etienne (2012), they sought to determine if
guilt was differentially associated with suicidal ideation in military personnel with a clear history
of direct combat exposure, and indeed found a positive interaction between guilt and direct
combat exposure with 97 active duty Air Force personnel, which in turn suggested to them a
strong relationship between guilt and suicidal ideation. In the more ambitious study, Bryan,
Bryan, Morrow, Etienne, and Ray-Sannerud (2013) used a general clinical sample of 151
predominantly active duty (98%) Air Force and Army personnel to explore the relationship
between moral injury and self-injurious thoughts and behaviors (SITB). The results backed up
what previous research had suggested, namely that Transgressions-Other correlates more
strongly with traditional symptoms of PTSD, while Transgressions-Self has a stronger
relationship with hopelessness, guilt, and shame.
The primacy of guilt and shame as key agents in moral injury has been highlighted in
almost all the clinical research on this subject. In their review of the literature on the association
between morality and the experience of guilt and shame in the military, Nazarov et al. (2015)
include the recent research by Bryan et al. (2013) and also note that guilt and shame are the
leading cause of veterans seeking care at the VA (as cited by Fontana & Rosenheck, 2004). They
conclude that there are “strong relations between the incurrence of a moral injury, the subsequent
development of symptoms of guilt and shame and the emergence of psychopathology, including
MDD and PTSD” (p. 10).
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The most significant work on the relationship between guilt, shame, and moral injury has
emerged from the research of Farnsworth, Drescher, Nieuwsma, Walser, & Currier (2014).
Farnsworth et al. (2014) examine moral injury through the complementary lenses of moral
psychology and social functionalism, with the intent of providing further insight into the
mechanisms of guilt and shame, as well as betrayal and abusive violence. They chart how in the
last decade advances in the study of moral psychology have provided new understanding of how
human beings both come to their moral judgments and make sense of those judgments. This
body of research has differentiated between positive and negative emotional states and examined
their adaptive purpose. Negative emotional states, they demonstrate, provide protective functions
by engaging the sympathetic nervous system (i.e. fight/flight), while positive emotions engage
the parasympathetic nervous system, and tend to enhance human functioning by building
resources.
As Farnsworth et al. (2014) explain, moral emotions specifically can hold both positive
and negative valences. Negative moral emotions include guilt, shame, anger, disgust, and
contempt; positive moral emotions include compassion, elevation, pride, and gratitude. Crucial
to note is that moral emotions, unlike nonmoral emotions, are fundamentally concerned with the
preservation of social relationships and with helping individuals avoid ostracism by other group
members (as cited in Rime, 2009; Haidt, 2003).
Farnsworth et al. (2014) cite a number of studies that demonstrate that when guilt is
limited to a specific transgression (and separated from other negative emotions) it has no
association with psychopathology (Tangney et al., 2007). Farnsworth et al. (2014), however,
distinguish between civilian guilt and combat-related guilt, noting that the latter has been
“associated with lower psychological well-being in military populations,” although “studies
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assessing military-related guilt may also be tapping into the more psychologically damaging
emotion of shame” (p. 452).
Indeed, shame has been associated in multiple studies with tremendous psychological
distress and symptomology (Lewis, 1971; Lansky, 1995; Tangney et al. 2007). As noted
previously, shame indicates a global evaluation of the self as being worthless or fundamentally
bad. It is accompanied by feelings of powerlessness, exposure, and vulnerability. In a recent
essay, Herman (2011) made the case for posttraumatic stress disorder being essentially a shame
disorder and stated that,
Shame can be likened to fear in many respects. Like fear, it is a fast-track
physiological response that in intense forms can overwhelm higher cortical
functions. Like fear, it is also a social signal, with characteristic facial and
postural signs that can be recognized across cultures. (p. 262)
Additionally, Farnsworth et al. (2014) maintain that
whereas guilt can promote greater empathy and socially reparative actions, shame
typically activates social hiding behaviors and decreases empathy due to increased
preoccupation with one’s own distress and emotional discomfort. Furthermore,
shame has been robustly associated with substance abuse, anger, and aggression,
whereas guilt often discourages these types of problematic behaviors. (p. 452)
Farnsworth et al.’s (2014) exploration of a social-functional model of morality within the
context of the military provides additional nuance to the moral injury construct. Social
functionalism is defined as “the pragmatic value of morality for the survival of a social group as
a whole” (p. 453). Some of the key moral emotions that are evoked in response to core social
issues are caring, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity (as cited in Graham, Haidt, & Nosek,
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2009). Since the good of the group depends on the individual holding back in some regard, this
holding back is encouraged by self-condemning emotions like anger, contempt or disgust. On the
other hand, self-condemning emotions like shame and guilt encourage repair of damage to the
group by an individual (Farnsworth et. al., 2014).
In a military context, of course, violence and killing are not only sanctioned but viewed
as critical for the good for the group. As Farnsworth et al. (2014) note, citing Soeters, Winslow,
& Weibull (2006), military training and indoctrination serves the purpose of shifting a new
soldier’s moral compass so that it is fully in line with the needs of their unit and ensures that
under combat situations a soldier will pull his or her trigger. As Farnsworth et al. (2014) state,
In such a moral system, the greatest shame for a service member would be to
forsake his or her unit in the face of danger, and the greatest moral anger is
typically reserved for those who put group members at risk. However, it is also
this tight moral system and its constituent moral emotions that may also enable
members of a fighting unit to engage in potentially morally injurious behaviors in
certain cases. Threats to or losses sustained within the fighting unit may prompt
strong other-condemning moral emotions (i.e., anger, disgust, contempt) that
increase the probability of abusive violence. (p. 12)
Farnsworth et al. (2014) also delineate how witnessing moral violations can lead to moral
injury, and give credence, from a social functionalist perspective, to Shay’s (1994, 2014) original
claim that betrayal by others is what leads to moral injury. They note how, as part of entering a
military universe and acclimating to a military-based moral code, leaders are endowed with
positive moral attributes, with a kind of nobility, and if those leaders violate their position and
thereby the attached values, the soldiers under them may be psychically impacted by feelings of
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betrayal and condemnatory moral emotions. Ajax, it could be said, exhibits condemnatory moral
emotions toward Odysseus. But such feelings may also be brought forth when a soldier
experiences betrayal from an enemy who posed as a friend or, as in the example Farnsworth et
al. (2014) give, from a child who delivers a bomb.
Farnsworth et al. (2014) highlight another potentially morally injurious scenario and time
period for soldiers: post-deployment. They point out that there is often a shattering disjuncture
between what is morally valued in the military world versus the civilian world. Civilians may
react with disgust or contempt upon hearing what soldiers have done in war; soldiers may
experience shame and anger in relation to their homecoming. In other words, the soldier may
find himself or herself stuck between two fundamentally different moral universes, which can
lead to experiences that are morally injurious in and of themselves. As Farnsworth et al. (2014)
state, “social-functionalist models of morality clarify not only the moral emotions experienced
by service members following moral injury, but also help to explain how moral emotions may
contribute to morally injurious behaviors themselves (p. 255).

Moral Repair
It is no accident that Litz et al.’s (2009) defining theoretical exploration of moral injury
ends with a preliminary treatment model, and that, indeed, so much of the clinical literature that
has followed has also tried to create models of repair or at least address treatment implications:
the clinical research community may need measures and conceptualizations in order to move
forward with the moral injury construct, but service members and veterans need help now.
Litz et al. (2009) define moral repair as “the integration of [a] moral violation into an
intact, although more flexible, functional belief system” (p. 701) and conceived their original
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treatment model (which would become adaptive disclosure) on the basis of two basic “routes” to
repair: “(a) psychological-and-emotional-processing of the memory of the moral transgression,
its meaning and significance, and the implication for the service member, and (b) exposure to
corrective life experience” (p. 701). Three years later, Grey et al. (2012) published an
introduction to and an evaluation of the six-session adaptive disclosure protocol in a study with
44 active duty Marines. Adaptive disclosure first uses imaginal exposure to uncover previously
hidden elements and details about the meaning and implications of the morally injurious event
and then employs an empty chair exercise, based on gestalt therapy techniques, to allow for
corrective experiences.
We ask the service member or veteran to have a real-time conversation in
imagination with a compassionate, generous, supportive and forgiving moral
authority figure. . . . [T]he goals are to have the patient ostensibly confess the
transgressive act of commission or omission and take on the role of the caring
other, reacting for him or her (Steenkamp et al., 2013, p. 474).
Forty three percent of the Marines in the study acknowledged a morally injurious experience as
the primary need for treatment and Gray et al. (2012) found that patients highly endorsed the
treatment, and that the effect sizes for PTSD (d =.79) and depression (d =.71) were large.
By way of further validating adaptive disclosure, Steencamp, Nash, Lebowitz & Litz
(2013) argue that there are three ways in which prolonged exposure (PE, Foa & Kozak, 1986)—
as previously noted, a widely-used treatment for PTSD at the Department of Defense and the
Department of Veterans Affairs—is not appropriate for moral injury. First, PE treatment assumes
that “the pathological fear structure is caused by a discrete episodic experience of danger and
perceived life threat” (p. 473), whereas certain experiences that have been demonstrated to cause
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moral injury are not fear based. Second, PE treatment maintains that guilt and shame, the
primary emotions underlying moral injury, have emotional pathways and mechanisms that are
different from the pathways and mechanisms of fear, and that repeated retelling of an event, a
primary fear-extinguishing technique used in PE, will not only not decrease shame and guilt but
will potentially increase them. Third, the two main cognitions targeted in PE—“I am
incompetent” and “the world is completely dangerous”—are profoundly different than the
cognitions that Steenkamp et al. (2013) believe underlie moral injury, namely, “culpability, being
damned and unforgiven, and self-loathing” (p. 472). Wholesale contextualizing of the event—
i.e., bad things happen in war, as is used in PE—may not feel authentic or reparative to the
person who has committed an act that fundamentally violates their moral code.
Two other studies place primary emphasis on the concept of self-forgiveness.
Worthington and Langbert (2012), who come from a Christian framework, cite selfcondemnation as the aftereffect of a toxic warzone combination of complex trauma and moral
injury. They conceive of self-forgiveness as the route to reparation and see it as having two core
components: (1) decisional self-forgiveness, which is making the choice to act towards oneself
without “malice, self-blame or self condemnation” (p. 282) and (2) emotional self-forgiveness,
which they describe as the “emotional replacement of unforgiving emotions toward the self like
self-empathy, self-sympathy, self-compassion and self-love” (p. 282). They propose a six-step
model to “responsible” self-forgiveness that hinges on Hall and Fincham’s (2005) notion that
“forgiveness of the self is related to making amends to the wronged person” (p. 282).
Bryan, Theriault, and Bryan (2015) propose in their quantitative study that because guilt
and shame are so strongly associated with suicidal ideation and attempts in a military
populations, thinking about the healing and protective properties of self-forgiveness, may prove
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critical. They define self-forgiveness as “the act of generosity and kindness toward the self
following self-perceived inappropriate action” (p. 40) and note that evidence suggests it has been
shown to improve mental health and decrease suicidal ideation (as cited by Doran, Kalayjian,
Toussaint, & DeMucci, 2012). Using a sample of 476 service members and veterans enrolled in
college, they hypothesized that self-forgiveness would be linked to less severe PTSD and that
service members and veterans with a history of suicidal ideation or attempts would report lower
levels of self-forgiveness. Both hypotheses were borne out, suggesting that self-forgiveness as a
dispositional characteristic may serve as a protective factor for individuals who experience
trauma, and thus may be useful for determining in advance those at particular risk. Bryan et al.
(2015) note that difficulty with forgiveness “is a symptom of moral injury that commonly occurs
in the aftermath of exposure to events that violate service members’ sense of right versus wrong
(e.g., “use of violence, witnessing of atrocities, exposure to intense suffering)” (p. 41), and argue
that their study suggests that another feature besides guilt and shame—i.e., difficulty with
forgiveness—can be associated with increased risk for suicidal attempts among service members
who have already considered suicide. Their results, they conclude, also point toward the
possibility that
treatments and interventions that facilitate self-forgiveness may reduce the
likelihood of suicide attempts, perhaps because self-forgiveness enables the
individual to view him-or-herself in a positive manner, to experience personal
growth, and to find meaning in behavior that is perceived to be wrong. (p. 45)
The first distinct call for models of moral repair treatment was, of course, put forward by
Shay (1994). Given the emphasis in his ground-breaking definition of moral injury on the
betrayal perpetrated by powerful others and his belief that the injuries of combat PTSD “are
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moral and social” (p. 187), it is not surprising that his ideas around treatment also hinge on the
moral and the social. While Shay does not offer a clear-cut treatment protocol, he urges for an
overhaul of our response to combat trauma and for a better understanding in the mental health
field that the repair of moral injury is dependent on a “communalization of trauma” (p. 194).
Veterans need to be able to create narratives around their experience, to remember and to mourn.
But simply creating their own trauma narrative is not enough: their narrative also needs to be
heard by listeners, both individual and collective, who are “strong enough to hear the story
without having to deny the reality of the experience or to blame the victim” (p. 188). This is not
an easy mandate, given that “[t]o hear and believe is to feel unsafe. It is to know the fragility of
goodness” (p. 193). But it is vital. As Shay notes,
Trauma narrative imparts knowledge to the community that listens and responds
to it emotionally. Emotion carries essential cognitive elements; it is not separable
from the knowledge. Something quite profound takes place when the trauma
survivor sees enlightenment take hold. The narrator now speaks as his or her free
self, not as the captive of the perpetrator. (p. 191)

Conclusion
In the last third of Virginia Woolf’s novel Mrs. Dalloway (1925), Septimus Warren
Smith, a World War I veteran suffering from what appears to be moral injury, kills himself.
Upon hearing of his suicide, Clarissa Dalloway, who has never met him, responds in the
following way:
What business had the Bradshaws to talk of death at her party? A young man had
killed himself. And they talked of it at her party—the Bradshaws, talked of death.
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He had killed himself—but how? Always her body went through it first, when she
was told, suddenly, of an accident; her dress flamed, her body burnt. He had
thrown himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; through him,
blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a thud, thud, thud in
his brain, and then a suffocation of blackness. So she saw it. But why had he done
it? (p. 184)
I would argue that Clarissa’s why remains with us today, and is precisely what is driving Litz et
al.’s (2009) formulation of moral injury and the wave of clinical scientific research that has
emerged to validate and expand this construct. But there is another element in the above passage
that is pertinent: Clarissa’s resistance to knowing about Septimus’ death. And that, of course,
remains as well.
Indeed, alongside the work of Litz et al. (2009), there is a parallel track of insight and
investigation into moral injury, galvanized by Shay and now led by contemporary philosophers,
theologians, journalists, novelists and even theater directors, that is concerned with our society’s
collective resistance to the implications of moral injury. Such lines of inquiry, some of which I
will incorporate more fully in my discussion chapter, also resist embedding moral injury in a
medical model, resist overly qualifying and quantifying this ancient state of being and, in some
cases, resist, as Woolf implicitly does, the notion that this injury is located solely within the
individual. As Warren Kinghorn (2012), a professor of psychiatry and pastoral and moral
theology at Duke, writes,
The recognition of moral injury therefore forces trauma psychology to regard the
human person in all of his or her complexity as a moral agent, fully situated
within and constituted by a sociocultural matrix of language and meaning and
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valuation in which “trauma” cannot be understood apart from understanding of
that matrix. Trauma of this sort is not an individual reality but a social reality, the
social is not the context in which individual trauma is inflicted, but just as
plausibly, the individual is the context in which social trauma is inflicted. (p. 62)
Along similar lines, Nancy Sherman (2015), a professor of philosophy at Georgetown,
identifies moral injury as a kind of multifaceted relational breakdown: between the soldier and
himself, between the soldier and whomever he/she killed or witnessed killed, and between the
soldier and civilian society. Recovery, she states, “is a matter of shared moral engagement. The
afterwar belongs to us all” (p. 3). This, of course, is a clear extension of Shay’s (1994) call for
“communalization” of war trauma as a crucial component in the healing of moral injury.
I highly value Sherman’s notion that moral injury requires an understanding of the
intrapersonal and the interpersonal, and that any kind of moral repair most likely hinges on
reconciling what has transpired for the self in relation to itself as well as in relation to others. I
also value Litz et al.’s (2009) urgent attempts to identify as precisely as possible what is
happening to our service members and veterans. What Litz et al. (2009) and the less constructbound thinkers like Shay (1994), Kinghorn (2012) and Sherman (2012, 2015)—not to mention
Brian Doerries (2015) and Virginia Woolf (1925)—share, is an unwavering belief that moral
injury shatters the self and that shattered selves often do not survive.
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Chapter III
Narrative Therapy

This is to propose that human beings are interpreting beings—that we are active
in the interpretation of our experiences as we live our lives. It’s to propose that
it’s not possible for us to interpret our experience without access to some frame of
intelligibility, one that provides a context for our experience, one that makes the
attribution of meaning possible. . . . It’s to propose that we live by the stories that
we have about our lives, that these stories actually shape our lives, constitute our
lives, and that they “embrace our lives.”
—Michael White, Re-authoring Lives: Interviews and Essays

Introduction
Narrative therapy, a collaborative approach to therapy, is well suited for social workers
who work with any kind of trauma in their practice, let alone the trauma—the moral injury—that
comes from experiences of war. It is a framework that at its heart seeks to separate the person
from the problem, to separate the identity of the solider, for example, from the problem of killing
in combat, the problem of grief, guilt, or shame.
Narrative therapy was pioneered in the 1980s in Australia by Michael White, and
continued to be rigorously developed and honed by White and his frequent collaborator, David
Epston, up until White’s death in 2008 (Furlong, 2008). While many other thinkers and
clinicians have contributed to our current understanding of narrative therapy and have made
possible its widespread use in the field of mental health as an alternative to psychodynamic
therapies, White’s creativity and brilliance is undeniably the foundation of this practice and
therefore his guiding formulations are what I will focus on here (Payne, 2006).
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White’s conceptualization of narrative therapy, which draws from multiple disciplines,
including sociology, anthropology, cybernetics, and social psychology, and from thinkers like
Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979), Edward Bruner (1986), Erving Goffman (1961, 1970), and
Michel Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984a), is firmly founded on post-modernist terrain (White &
Epston, 1990). A post-modernist vantage point holds that human existence cannot be fully
pinned down and that no matter the lens through which it is studied—economics, psychology,
sociology, etc.—it is too unique and complex and non-static an experience for any definite
conclusions to be drawn. Within this framework, the notion of expert knowledge is viewed as
biased and limited and “often remote from the specific concrete knowledge of people living their
unique lives from day to day” (Payne, 2006, p. 25).
Foucault’s (1984) deconstruction of systems of power and knowledge and his emphasis
on subjugated “alternative knowledges” (White & Epston, p. 21) were galvanizing for White,
who oriented his own thinking around them, particularly with regard to three fundamental
assumptions he brought to narrative practices:
1. It is the totalizing, dominant “truths” or narratives about human nature
and human existence that have created the problems people suffer from in the first
place (White, 2007, p. 24). As White & Epston (1990) note,
a person’s experience is problematic to him because he is being
situated in stories that others have about him and his relationships,
and that these stories are dominant to the extent that they allow
insufficient space for the performance of the person’s preferred
stories. Or we could assume that the person is actively
participating in the performance of stores that she finds unhelpful,
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unsatisfying, and dead-ended and that these stories do not
sufficiently encapsulate the person’s lived experience or are very
significantly contradicted by important aspects of the person’s
lived experience. (p. 14)
2. The therapist, in order not to unwittingly collude with dominant
narratives, must take a collaborative, de-centered position in relation to people
who seek help. White likened the therapist’s posture to that of an “investigative
reporter,” a figure who can help “expose” the “politics” of the problems in
people’s lives (White, 2007, p. 26, p. 27).
3. The key to unbinding people from their problems—from their
“canonical narratives” around such things as professional success, parenting, or
heterosexuality—(Payne, 2006, p. 21)—is to deconstruct dominant narratives and
thereby uncover rich areas of “subjugated knowledges” (White & Epston, 1995, p.
25) that are more in synch with actual lived experience.
White considered narrative therapy to be a post-structuralist therapy, and indeed, an
exquisite sensitivity to the practices of power within language, within the analogies and
metaphors that are used to describe human experience, is evident throughout narrative practice
(Payne, 2006). Language, in the view of White and other post-structuralists, constitutes much of
our experience and therefore our sense of ourselves and of our agency in the world. The
difference, for example, between using the Freudian psychoanalytic analogy of a “breakdown” to
describe a person’s situation (which, as White points out, is drawn from the positivist social
sciences and represents people and problems as machines) is vastly different than using the
analogy of a rite of passage, drawn from ritual processes, which constructs the situation in terms
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of a separation phase (from a previous identity or state), a liminal phase, and a reincorporation
phase (White & Epston, 1990).
For White it is the text analogy, which rests on the basic notion that we give meaning to
our lives and experience, “through the storying of experience” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 12),
that is a founding assumption of narrative practice in part because of its inherent potential for
“flux” and its “relative indeterminancy” (p. 13). As White & Epston note,
the text analogy introduces us to an intertextual world. In the first sense it
proposes that persons’ lives are situated in texts within texts. In the second sense,
every telling or retelling of a story through its performance, is a new telling that
encapsulates, and expands upon the previous telling. (p. 13)
While White (2007) does not propose that “life is simply a text,” he does believe there is much
richness to be found in drawing “parallels…between the structure of literary texts and the
structure of meaning-making in everyday life” (p. 80). Privileging the notion of a text analogy
within narrative therapy opened the door for the exploration of the use of therapeutic documents.
As White & Epston (1990) note, “language plays a very central part in those activities that define
and construct persons.” Since “written language makes a more than significant contribution to
this . . . a consideration of modern documents and their role in the redescription of persons is
called for” (p. 188). Such documents, which can include letters of introduction, letters of
redundancy, letters of prediction, letters of counter-referral, letters of reference, letters for special
occasions, letters as narrative, and letters as self stories, as well as documents of certification and
of declaration, have remained a vital component of this practice (White & Epston, 1990).
White’s prodigious synthesis of ideas, theories, and practices into narrative therapy lasted
right up until his death. In his final book, Maps of Narrative Practice (2007), published the year
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before he died, White drew together four interrelated processes for therapeutic change:
Externalizing, Re-Authoring, Re-Membering, and Definitional Ceremonies. In my view, this
final organization of narrative processes, all of which White had previously written about in a
variety of guises and contexts, successfully distills the multiple therapeutic approaches he used
throughout his career; they all, in their own way, address White’s indefatigable quest to support
people’s agency in shaping their own lives. In the remainder of this chapter, I will offer a more
in-depth description of each, as they offer potentially impactful therapeutic resonance with the
phenomenon of moral injury.

Externalizing the Problem
According to Carr (1988) and Payne (2006), the most enduring and central therapeutic
technique of narrative therapy is externalizing the problem. This entails first naming the
problem—giving it its own identity, so to speak, one that is “experience-near” as opposed to
“experience-distant” (White, 2007, p. 40)—and then coming to recognize it as something that is
affecting a person rather than something that is an innate part of a person. It is fundamentally depathologizing because it takes as its premise the notion that “[t]he person is not the problem: the
problem is the problem” (Epston, 1989, p. 26) and that, relatedly, the problem is not determinant
of a person’s identity or life. Movement away from the problem is always possible—as is not
necessarily the case, White might argue, in therapies or psychologies that view people as being
primarily influenced by intrapsychic forces—because the problem, on both a purely linguistic as
well as metaphorical level, is defined as being outside the person. A person is not, in this
framework, objectified as a schizophrenic, but is rather a person with the problem called
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schizophrenia. (That said, White would undoubtedly rail against the term schizophrenia as he
stood firmly against what he viewed as the dominant, pathologizing discourse of diagnosis.)
By separating the problem from the person, narrative therapy does not seek to diminish
the influence of the problem or to absolve the person from responsibility in the face of the
problem. Indeed, as White (2007) notes, such separation makes it
more possible for people to assume this responsibility. If the person is the
problem there is very little that can be done outside of taking action that is selfdestructive. But if a person’s relationship with the problem becomes more clearly
defined, as it does in externalizing conversations, a range of possibilities become
available to revise this relationship. (p. 26)
Externalizing conversations, as narrative practice maintains, offers people the opportunity not
just to tease out the effects or influence of the problem in their life—i.e., What has X persuaded
you to believe about yourself? or What are the effects of X on your relationship with your
girlfriend, with your siblings, with your fellow veterans?—but to also investigate why the effects
of a problem are—or are not—okay with a person. This line of inquiry re-instates personal
agency and provides people with the opportunity to assess their values, goals, and dreams,
thereby “develop[ing] important conceptions of living, including their intentional understanding
about life . . . their knowledge about life and life skills, and their prized learnings and
realizations” (White, 2007, p. 49).
It is important to note that while externalizing the problem is a core component of
narrative practice, White and others operating from within this framework do not consider it to
be advisable in every situation (Carr, 1998, Payne, 2006). Indeed, White’s entire philosophy, his
commitment to narrative theory and therapy, is to subvert any absolutes—in life or practice
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(White, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2006). Instead, he counsels rigorous consciousness and respect for the
uniqueness of each person, each problem, each situation. He states,
This consciousness discourages the therapist from inviting the externalizing of
problems such as violence and sexual abuse. When these problems are identified,
the therapist would be inclined to encourage the externalizing of the attitudes and
beliefs that appear to compel the violence, and those strategies that maintain
persons in their subjugation. (White, 1989, p. 12; emphasis added)

Re-Authoring
Re-authoring in narrative therapy is first about locating and making space for the “unique
outcomes” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 15) in people’s lives that run counter to dominant stories
of suffering or oppression. Unique outcomes are the pockets of experience—again, the
“subjugated knowledges” from a Foucauldian frame (White & Epston, 1990, p. 25)—that have
previously been overshadowed by totalizing cultural narratives. Unique outcomes stand in direct
contrast to problem-heavy narratives that bring people in to therapy in the first place. They are
about those moments, large or small, when the so-called problem did not dominate, when
resistance or subversion were employed and a flicker of an alternate plotline was made visible.
Once recognized, unique outcomes serve as stepping stones to the rebuilding, the reauthoring of
alternate narratives to live by, narratives that can be more in synch with a person’s true values
and actual lived experience.
Drawing directly from the work of the social psychologist Jerome Bruner (1986), White
(2007) proposes that stories, be they the stories in novels or the stories of our lives, are composed
of two main landscapes: “landscapes of action” (p. 78), which refers to the sequences of events
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or plotlines, and “landscapes of identity” (p. 78) which are reflections on and “intentional
understandings” of the action. Crucially, in both written and lived texts there are always “gaps”
(p. 77) in the storylines. In good novels, these “gaps” allow the reader to bring in their own lived
experience, make their own leaps and conclusions, and essentially enter the text.
The “gaps” in the texts of lives are, of course, the “unique outcomes” and again, the job
of a good narrative practitioner, through structured landscape of action and identity
questioning—what White calls “mapping” (p. 83)—is to help make those moments more visible
to the person. An example of a landscape of action question might be “What sort of step would
this be if you took it?” (p. 96), while a landscape of identity question might be “What does this
step suggest about what you hold precious? (p. 105). From a narrative viewpoint, both questions
thicken personal narratives and in so doing help facilitate for people an experience “of being
knowledged” (p. 106) about their own lives. The power of that knowledge allows for movement.
As White (2007) puts it,
The therapist facilitates the development of these alternative storylines by
introducing questions that encourage people to recruit their lived experience, to
stretch their minds, to exercise their imagination, and to employ their meaningmaking resources. People become curious about, and fascinated with, previously
neglected aspects of their lives and relationships, and as these conversations
proceed, these alternative storylines thicken, become more significantly rooted in
history, and provide people with a foundation for new initiatives in addressing the
problems, predicaments, and dilemmas of their lives. (pp. 61-62)
As White’s words make clear, it is not the simple recalling of unique outcomes that makes a
difference. It is instead the expanding of them through linkages to other historic moments that
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calls forth the possibility of new understandings, that brings forth “indeterminacy,” and enables
the rejection of “determined storylines” (Payne, 2006, p. 94).

Re-membering
Re-membering, within White’s (2007) narrative framework, is based on the idea that we
are always surrounded by influential others, by people inside and outside of our families of
origin who have played profound roles in shaping who we are. These influential others, in
White’s view, do not have to be human; they can also be, for example, authors who have
mattered to us, fictional characters we have encountered, pets we have owned, beloved toys from
childhood. Human identity, within this framework, is “founded upon an ‘association of life’
rather than on a core self” (p. 129), and to that end narrative therapy highly values the voices of
others in the building or re-authoring of lives. Re-membering conversations, White explains, are
“purposive reengagements with the history of one’s relationship with significant figures and with
the identities of one’s present life and projected future” (p. 129).
White’s conceptualizations of re-membering conversations originated with his dismay
over the “normative” and “pathologizing” (White & Epston, 1998, p. 134) response to people
who were deemed to be suffering from unremitting grief. He found that the prescription to move
through the stages of grief and get over the loss of a loved one not only increased a sense of loss
of the loved one, but bored a hole right though a person’s sense of self and of their own agency.
Instead, White focused on finding ways to incorporate the lost relationship, to use the metaphor
of “saying hullo again” to help people “thicken” their experience of themselves as being part of a
“membered club” and not an isolated, “encapsulated self” (p. 138). At the same time, the process
of re-membering can “revoke” (p. 138) membership and de-emphasize those voices in a person’s
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life that have contributed to a subjugated sense of self or purpose. In both cases, the movement is
toward action and agency, rather than passivity and paralysis. In White’s view, the act of remembering enables people to have a more acute sense of what they know and value, and this in
turn “can provide the basis for them to develop specific proposals about how they might proceed
with their lives” (White, 2007, p. 138).

Definitional Ceremonies
White’s formulation of definitional ceremonies—which are structured occasions that
allow a person to tell their “preferred stories” to an actual audience—draws heavily on the work
of the cultural anthropologist Barbara Myerhoff (1982, 1986), and also, to a lesser extent, on the
reflecting processes developed by the family systems therapist Tom Anderson (1987). Myerhoff,
who coined the term “definitional ceremonies,” had observed the healing benefits that occurred
for a group of elderly Jewish holocaust survivors who came together as a community to create
different contexts or “forums” in which they could tell, again and again, the stories of their lives,
and in so doing mitigate their isolation—and the inevitable, identity-crushing feeling of
invisibility that comes along with such isolation (White, 2007, pp. 180-81). In Maps of Narrative
Practice (2007), White includes Myerhoff’s (1982) elegant analysis of why such forums had
such a beneficial effect for this particular marginalized and traumatized community. Given its
applicability to communities of combat veterans, her words are worth reproducing here:
Sometimes conditions conspire to make a generational cohort acutely selfconscious and then they become active participants in their own history and
provide their own sharp, insistent definitions of themselves and explanations for
their destiny, past and future. They are then knowing actors in a historical drama
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they script, rather than subjects of someone else’s study. They “make”
themselves, sometimes even “make themselves up,” an activity which is not
inevitable or automatic but reserved for special people in special circumstances.
(p. 100)
Key to the healing and identity-consolidating benefits of such occasions, in both
Myerhoff and White’s view, is the presence of an active audience—what White (2007) came to
call “outsider witnesses” (p. 184). The audience’s presence and participation, their active
listening, and most of all, their own experience of being changed by the stories is vitally
important for these occasions. As White notes, “It was the audience recognition of these stories
that so significantly contributed to the community members’ achieving a sense of feeling at one
with their claims about their lives” (p. 183).
In translating Myerhoff’s ideas about the meaning of such occasions into narrative
practice’s version of definitional ceremonies, White created a very specific structure:
1. The telling of the significant narrative by the person.
2. The re-telling of the narrative by those invited to be present as outsider
witnesses.
3. The retelling of the outsider witnesses’s retelling by the person. (p. 185)
White issues a clear warning of the ethical responsibility of therapists on such occasions.
They are responsible both for the careful selection of the outsider witnesses and for preventing
these moments from devolving into anti-transformative affirmations of the person telling their
story. While White is clear that affirmation and validation of experiences can have a helpful
place in daily life, they are not what definitional ceremonies are about. Definitional ceremonies
are also not, in his words, about
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offering congratulatory responses, pointing out positives, focusing on strengths
and resources, making moral judgments or evaluating people’s lives against
cultural norms . . . interpreting the lives of others and formulating hypotheses,
delivering interventions with the intention of resolving people’s problems, giving
advice or presenting moral stories or homilies, reframing the events of people’s
lives, imposing alternative stories about peoples’ lives, trying to help people with
their predicaments and dilemmas, or expressing worry for the lives of others.
(White, 2007, p. 187)
Instead, they are, at bottom, about one simple thing: resonance. The resonance between the
outsider witness and the person at the center of the definitional ceremony creates “rich story
development” (p. 189) and vitally aids the person at the center of the ceremony in trusting in
their preferred narrative. In order to offer the most effective retellings, White guides his outsider
witnesses in their active listening to focus especially on “expressions” within the story,
“images” within the story, their own “personal resonances,” and finally, on the experience of
their own “transport” (White, 2007, pp. 190-91).
In formulating these guidelines for response, White (2007) had in mind the ancient Greek
understanding of katharsis, which he pointedly spells it with a ‘k’ in order to “distinguish it
from contemporary notions of catharsis associated with metaphors of discharge, release,
abreaction, and so on” (p. 194). The classic definition, he notes, hinges on the experience of
witnessing a powerful display of “life’s dramas” (p. 195) and in response being emotionally
moved and transported to a place of possible new meanings and new understandings of one’s
own life. What the outsider witnesses need to specifically consider and then relay back, he
argues, are the ways in which they “have become someone other than [they] would have been if
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[they] had not been present to witness these expressions” (p. 195). White’s contention is that for
the person at the center of this ceremony to hear of his or her own agency in this regard is
revelatory, and often a counter-action to feelings of worthlessness, despair, paralysis and
isolation. White particularly notes the benefit of this kind of ceremony for people who have
experienced significant trauma in their lives. He states,
It is common for these people to hold onto a secret longing for the world to be
different due to what they have been through or a secret hope that all that they
endured wasn’t for nothing, a hidden desire to contribute to the lives of others
who have had similar experiences or a fantasy about playing a part in relieving the
suffering of others, or a passion to play a part in acts of redress in relation to the
injustices of the world. . . . [P]erformances of katharsis can be powerfully
resonant with these longings, hopes, desires, fantasies, and passions. (p. 200)
White’s narrative framework clearly views definitional ceremonies as yet another
invaluable tool with which to dismantle totalizing discourses and the exertion of expert
knowledge. The person at the center of the ceremony is positioned as both central and part of a
responsive collective. Agency is experienced by both parties, and hitherto unforeseen narrative
“plots” for each, as Meyerhoff (1986, p. 284) points out, are advanced. Lives in this narrative
model are indeed more indeterminate, and problems—even the problems of severe trauma—are
not cemented in place.

Conclusion
Undoubtedly, had White lived, his explorations of the varied and nuanced ways in which
people can take charge of their lives would have continued. Narrative practice for him, as anyone
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who enters one of his texts can plainly see, was not reducible to a therapy or an approach. It was,
as he said, “better defined as a world view . . . but even this is not enough. Perhaps, it’s an
epistemology, a philosophy, a personal commitment, a politics, a practice, a life” (White, 1994,
p. 82).
At this juncture, I’d like to raise several critical questions, questions that will be
developed more fully in my discussion chapter. For example, what might Michael White’s
conceptualization of narrative theory and therapy—and the various iterations of the practice that
have continued since his death—offer to social workers who work with veterans in the grip of
moral injury? To what degree is this a useful framework through which to view the trauma of, to
quote Litz et al. (2009), “perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about
acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (p. 368)? Indeed, would a
narrative perspective even accept the term “moral injury,” or at least the current operationalizing
of a complex set of emotional responses?
Aspects of narrative therapy, of course, are to be found already in many approaches to
combat trauma, in, for example, the narrative portions of Cognitive Processing Therapy, one of
the Department of Veterans Affairs go-to PTSD treatments (Department of Veterans Affairs,
2015), as well as in Litz et al.’s adaptive disclosure protocol for moral injury, which, as noted
earlier, asks the veteran to imagine “a compassionate, generous, supportive, and forgiving moral
authority” (Steenkamp et al., 2013, p. 474)—a clear form of re-membering.
But a serious consideration of aspects of narrative theory and practice in relation to the
phenomenon of moral injury strikes me as important. If one simply holds in the forefront of
one’s mind White & Epston’s (1990) notion of a receiving context, then from the start “a
different construction of the problem would be invited and different questions will be asked” (p.
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7). If, for example, one were to shift analogies away from broken parts, broken insides, broken
morality, and view a combat soldier’s return to civilian life as a “rite of passage” that involved
“separating” from a previous identity and status, moving through an uncomfortable, reorganizing
“liminal phase,” and finally reaching a “reincorporation phase,” then that person’s position to
himself and others might feel radically different (White & Epston, 1990, pp. 7-8). Arguably, the
same would be true if one applied the narrative tools of externalizing—separating an identity
from the isolating, paralyzing shame and guilt of moral injury and redefining the problem in an
“experience-near” way (White, 2007, p. 42)—or re-authoring, so that alternate narratives could
be constructed that would de-fang totalizing attitudes around strength, violence and heroism.
Both re-membering (those dead, those killed, and those who are knowledged about subjugated
aspects of an individual) and the creation of definitional ceremonies (Theater of War is an
example of the latter) are, it seems to me, highly relevant to the phenomenon of moral injury and
the experiences of combat veterans in general.
That said, I have long been compelled by psychoanalytic approaches to human
development, identity formation, and trauma. Given the magnitude of what I believe is
experienced internally by those who are morally injured, a psychoanalytically oriented
perspective on how human beings experience and respond to trauma must be considered
alongside narrative practice. Can there be areas of overlap, of mutual expansion, of “rich story
development” (White, 2007, p. 144) in the project of lessening the life-threatening impact of
moral injury? With that question in mind, I will turn now to consider the work of the relational
psychoanalyst Ghislaine Boulanger, a pioneer in the emerging field of adult onset trauma theory.
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Chapter IV
Relational Psychoanalysis and Adult Onset Trauma Theory

We pulled Murph free from the tangle of brush and laid him out in some shadow
of respectability. We stood and looked him over. He was broken and bruised and
cut and still pale except for his face and hands, and now his eyes had been
gouged out, the two hollow sockets looking like red angry passages to his mind.
His throat had been cut nearly through, his head hung limply and lolled from side
to side, attached only by the barely intact vertebrae. We dragged him like a shot
deer out of a wood line, trying but failing to keep his naked body from banging
against the hard ground and bouncing in a way that would be forever burned into
our memories. His ears were cut off. His nose was cut off, too. He had been
imprecisely castrated.
—Kevin Powers, The Yellow Birds

Introduction
In the previous chapter, I presented Michael White’s formulations of narrative theory and
practice, which rest on the belief that as human beings we create stories in order to give meaning
to our lives, and that this storying of experience provides a context and determining shape for the
actual way we live. Personal agency, in White’s (2007) view, hinges on our ability to privilege
certain forms of knowledge and experience over others—to construct rich narratives that break
from dominant, pathologizing storylines and are instead in synch with lived experience.
The development of rich narratives of experience is also of central concern for the
relational psychoanalyst Ghislaine Boulanger (2007), whose pioneering work on the
phenomenon of adult-onset trauma will be the focus of this chapter. Boulanger’s theory, which
explores from within a relational framework what happens to a “self in crisis” (p. 77), a self that
has experienced events that the mind cannot digest, hinges on the sharp distinction she makes
between the phenomenology of trauma incurred as an adult and the phenomenology of trauma
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incurred as a child—a difference that she ardently believes the psychoanalytic community has
failed to appreciate. Her understanding of adult onset trauma has valuable implications for the
treatment of individuals experiencing moral injury, as it delineates the sequelae of the shattering
of an adult self and challenges long-held psychoanalytic notions about “the durability of psychic
structure” (p. 12), as well as the classical psychoanalytic tendency to view adult reactions to
external events as driven exclusively by the individual’s developmental history and particular
object relations.
At the same time, Boulanger is operating from within a relational framework; she is
committed to the importance of conscious and unconscious processes, to the interplay of fantasy
and reality, to the representation of mental states in bodily phenomena, and to the belief that the
psyche constructs defenses and obstacles in the face of unsettling thoughts and feelings. Her
theory thus offers a way to view moral injury through not only a cognitive behavioral lens (such
as the one that most of the Department of Veteran Affairs PTSD treatment protocols are based
on), nor only through an externalizing, deconstructing lens (such as the one that narrative
practice offers), but also through the breadth and complexity of a psychodynamic lens.
To that end I will first offer a brief overview of the relational tradition from which
Boulanger’s theory springs.

Relational Psychoanalysis
The “relational turn” (Wachtel, 2008, p. viii) in psychoanalysis was driven by a varied
group of thinkers and psychoanalysts (Mitchell & Greenburg, 1983; Aron, 2011; Bromberg,
1993; Benjamin, 1988; Davies & Frawley, 1994) who felt a theoretical urgency to crack open the
tightly sealed intrapsychic view of human subjectivity that Freud first developed and emphasize
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instead the fundamental intersubjectivity of human experience. The developing consensus was
that, as Mitchell (1988) put it, “[e]mbeddedness is endemic to human experience” (p. 276).
Drawing on traditions of thought such as object relations, Sullivanian interpersonal
theory, self psychology, gender studies, infancy and attachment research, relational theory
“recontextualizes” classical notions of internal structures and unconscious processes by
conceiving of those structures and processes in relation to an other, in relation to a context
(Wachtel, 2008, p. 40.) Relational theory, which is really an umbrella term rather than one set
theory, thus attends simultaneously to 1) the centrality of the self; 2) the self’s need for
relatedness to objects/others, and 3) the dynamic, on-going tension between self and other, past
and present, intrapsychic and interpersonal (Aron, 2011, p. 113). For relational theorists, all
exchanges within the therapeutic setting are co-constructed by patient and therapist, just as the
relationship between mother and child is intersubjective and co-created. Relational thought is
grounded as well in a belief in the determining significance of race, class, and culture as forces
that are “an intrinsic part of the psychological depths . . . fundamentally determinative of both
conscious and unconscious thought and experience” (Wachtel, 2011, p. 69).
Some key constructs in relational theory include the relational unconscious, self states,
and dissociation. The relational unconscious—unlike the Freudian model of the unconscious,
where distressing thoughts and feelings are considered repressed—is thought of as a stage for
what Bollas (1989) calls the “unthought known,” (p. 4), a location for templates of relationships
that are not fully known to the individual yet still feel familiar and are determinative of behavior.
Self states are a reformulation of the Freudian idea of a compact unitary self and, according to
Bromberg (1993), speak to the self as being “nonunitary in origin— a mental structure that
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begins and continues as a multiplicity of self-states that maturationally attain a feeling of
coherence” (p. 162).
The concept of dissociation is central within relational thought. As Boulanger (2007)
notes, the idea of dissociation re-merged when several psychoanalytic thinkers, notably Davies &
Frawley (1994), began to grapple with the emotional effects of childhood sexual abuse, viewing
the accounts and behavior of their clients as representative of reality rather than fantasy, as had
more or less been the dominant psychoanalytic view since Freud abandoned his seduction theory
(Boulanger, 2007, p. 26). Dissociation within the context of childhood abuse was understood to
be the process whereby painful experiences and thoughts are split off and stored in multiple selfstates, rather than repressed in an encompassing unconscious. A relational perspective maintains
that when a child encounters abuse “she defensively dissociates in the face of her terror, her
confusion, and the unmanageable stimulation she is experiencing, forming split-off self states
encapsulating the entire set of traumatic self and object representations, leaving other self states
free to engage a less threatening world” (p. 13).
It is important to note that in relational thought dissociation is not just a phenomenon
driven by abuse, but is something that happens to all of us, and is a reflection of the multiplicity
of our self-states, the different selves we consciously or unconsciously shift into depending on
the context. What is considered a “healthy” use of dissociative processes is when we can, as
Bromberg (1996) puts it, “stand in the spaces” between these self states and not defensively
cordon off certain ones that may contain aspects of a traumatized self, thus hindering emotional
flexibility and behavior.
The process of dissociation can also occur on a macro level, and indeed, Boulanger sees
just such a process at work when it comes to the failure of society in general and the
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psychoanalytic community in particular to respond to the catastrophic events that plague our
world. Again, this has implications for the phenomenon of moral injury, given that those who are
currently affirming its existence within the healthcare system (Litz et al., 2009) have discovered
that the wide gap between the universe of the military and the universe of the civilian world can
in and of itself be morally injurious for those attempting to navigate that divide. For Boulanger,
such a gap represents that which a collective group does not want to see, and she frames her
conception of such a divide, informed by a Lacanian perspective, within the context of adult
onset trauma:
It is as if psychoanalytic theory itself has denied or dissociated the possibility of
lasting reactions to late onset trauma, just as childhood seduction was also denied
for much of the last century. This stepchild to psychoanalysis is properly located
in Lacan’s register of the Real. Events that constantly fail to secure a place in
social discourse—slipping out of conscious awareness and defying memory’s
attempts to register them, leaving instead a gap where understanding might be, or
a sense of confusion where clarity might be—belong to the Real. The Real is at
work in every act of destructive violence that is rapidly normalized, every
instance of genocide that is overlooked, every war whose combatants find no
socially acceptable avenue in which to describe their experiences and so are
condemned to silence. (p. 4)

Wounded by Reality
Ghislaine Boulanger (2007) traces the beginning of her interest in the phenomenon of
adult onset trauma to an epidemiological study of Vietnam veterans and their civilian
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counterparts that she was a part of in 1976. Her goal was to parse “what had caused the
psychological breakdown of so many veterans on their return home” (p. 8). She hypothesized
that she would find predisposing factors that led to the development of PTSD; instead, she
discovered, quoting Grinker and Spiegel (1945), that “every man had his breaking point” (p. 44,
as cited in Boulanger, 2007). Since then, she has published a book—Wounded by Reality:
Understanding and Treating Adult Onset Trauma (2007)—and numerous articles (2008, 2009,
2010, 2012a, 2012b) on her evolving conception of adult onset-trauma.
A handful of other theorists have offered meaningful conceptualizations of aspects of
adult onset trauma, and Boulanger readily acknowledges psychoanalysts like Kardiner (1969),
Krystal (1978, 1985), Des Pres (1976), and Laub & Auerhan (1989), many of whom were
writing in response to the horrors of World War II and the Shoah. But Boulanger is, to my
knowledge, the only writer who has truly synthesized the existing material and offered a
systematic formulation of the symptomology and phenomenology of this kind of trauma, not to
mention the only one that I have found to claim that “adult onset trauma can actually be more
damaging than trauma in childhood” (p. 39).
So what does this kind of damage, this psychic “breaking point” look like from
Boulanger’s perspective? An utter buckling of the self: “massive psychic trauma collapse[s] the
distinction between the world without and the world within” (p. 10). As a result, “nightmares and
violent fantasies suddenly find their equivalent in external events, leading to the collapse of
psychic space and foreclosing the mind’s ability to reflect” (p. 10).
To be clear, with the term “adult onset trauma,” Boulanger is referring to those situations
where adults face either their own imminent annihilation or the annihilation of those around
them; she has little patience for what she sees as the wild overuse of the term “traumatic” within
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our society as potentially applying to almost any situation. But in extreme instances of adult
trauma she theorizes that an individual’s humanity, their sense of themselves as having an intact
subjectivity, is abruptly fragmented—that they are reduced to a “thing . . . denied history, and
denied a meaningful context in which to live and to relate to others” (2008, p. 641). Boulanger
sees the individual then existing in a gap “entre deux morts”—a Lacanian term that refers to two
deaths, a “natural” or “biological” death, which is part of nature’s usual process, and an
“absolute death.” As she explains, “Their biological death has not happened, but they . . . feel
themselves to be outsiders; intimate knowledge of mortality has robbed them of their citizenship
within the ranks of the living” (2007, p. 38). In a recent New York Times article, a marine combat
veteran of the war in Afghanistan gave voice to this precise sensation when he said, “Now, when
I meet someone, I already know what they look like dead. I can’t help but think that way. And I
ask myself, ‘Do I want to live with this feeling for the rest of my life, or is it better to just finish
it off?’” (Philipps, 2015).
Psychoanlysis, in Boulanger’s view, has historically not been able to fully mentalize the
very specific processes of adult onset trauma because the focus—indeed the very notion of the
trauma—has been solely on the individual’s response rather than on the event itself. They have
also, in her view, “confused reason with reality, arguing that the irrational exists within the
psyche, not in the external world” (p. 57). But, as she and a few others (notably Des Pres,1976)
point out, truly horrific events turn that which for most of us might be metaphorical or fantasized
into actuality. Before other meaning can be made, that terrifying non-symbolic reality must be
understood and assimilated. Boulanger states that in the aftermath of such events,
[s]ymbols and the symbolic lose their currency. . . . When indifferent reality
cannot be assimilated or altered psychically, when it cannot be symbolized, it
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becomes traumatic reality. It is a reality that sticks in the psychic craw and cannot
be dislodged. The survivor is always choking on the fact of it, always fearing a
repetition of the breakdown that has already happened (Boulanger, 2007, p. 5658, citing Winnicott, 1974).

Catastrophic Dissociation in Adulthood
Relational theory’s rediscovery of dissociation (Boulanger, 2008, p. 642) allowed
clinicians to understand the mechanism whereby a child, to defend against unbearable stimuli
and thoughts and feelings—and therefore a state of utter fragmentation—cordoned off traumatic
events and memories into split off self states, leaving other self states to function and develop.
As Boulanger notes, “In childhood, trauma becomes part of self-experience” (2007, p. 29).
For adults, who already have a developed self, as well as an observing capacity to
understand death, the process is significantly different—and it is precisely catastrophic
dissociation, in Boulanger’s (2008) view, that causes the collapse of the self:
In adulthood, the dissociative process in the face of trauma does not create further
splits in a developed personality but defends against terror, leaving an indelible
memory of the dissociative experience itself. Provisionally catastrophic
dissociation offers protection from terror, but ultimately it leaves the survivor in a
state of confusion and anomie. (p. 643)
Pulling together research and theory from affective neuroscience, emotions theory, Winnicottian
object relations and relational theory, Boulanger deconstructs the actual process of a self
collapsing through catastrophic dissociation by charting the way it impacts four key interrelated
areas: an individual’s sense of agency, physical cohesion, continuity, and affectivity. Crucial to
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understand here is that her conceptualization of a “core self” is somewhat at odds with relational
theory’s idea of multiple self states, which she also subscribes to. As she explains it, her
understanding of a core self is in synch with Damasio’s (1994, 1999) “ever-changing
biologically based core self” and with Bucci’s (2001) “subsymbolic sources of the self”:
phenomena that exist at the edge of our consciousness and “are comprised of the tactile, motoric,
visual, sensory, and affective senses and are central to one’s body and emotional experience”
(Boulanger, 2008, p. 643). Boulanger argues that by including these neurologically and
biologically-based components into a conceptualization of human subjectivity,
it is possible to conceive of an underlying core self that establishes broad
physiological and psychological parameters, while shifting self states embedded
within the core are informed by the relative durability of the core self or—in the
case of adult onset trauma—by the traumatically undermined core self. (p. 644)

Agency, Physical Cohesion, Continuity, Affectivity
One’s sense of agency is, as Boulanger maintains, inextricably linked to one’s sense of a
reassuring and reliable existence where one can control one’s actions and movement. She notes
that Stern (1985) and Fonagy et al. (2002) see this aspect of core self experience first emerging
with the infant and young child’s ability to control motor behavior. But such control over
movement is often obliterated during traumatic experience, in which people freeze or soil
themselves or lose control of their body’s movement, as can happen in instances of sexual attack.
Being under the control of an Other entity, whether it is another human being or a New York
City tower collapsing—or even the unwilled process of dissociation itself—brings a person, in
Boulanger’s mind, back to a paranoid schizoid position where “the self exists only as an object”
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(2007, p. 81). From such a position, the self is at the ongoing mercy of “persecutory
convictions,” be they thoughts, feelings, or sensations prompted by a memory, a sound, a smell,
even the quality of the light. “Traumatic memories often resist the survivor’s need to make sense
of them. Instead, assaulted by memory fragments and unidentifiable sensations, survivors find
themselves further alienated from a formerly stable core self” (p. 82).
Catastrophic dissociation’s impact on physical cohesion is equally destabilizing. Our
skin, our bones, all of the components of our body are, in such moments, revealed to be
horrendously fragile. Boulanger (2007) writes that “When the sense of physical cohesion is
threatened during trauma, there is a fragmentation of bodily experience, leading to
depersonalization, out-of-body experiences, and derealization” (p. 85). Drawing on Winnicottian
ideas around handling the baby and thus aiding in the formation of the baby’s sense of physical
and psychic integrity, Boulanger describes the body as functioning as a kind of “a psychic
container” (p. 87) that allows for both a secure sense of self as well as a sense of the separateness
of others, which is ultimately necessary for mutually satisfying human connection. But under
conditions of extreme trauma, when we lose our sense of physical cohesion,
[t]he body can no longer contain agency, affect, or objects; the distinction
between inner and outer collapses. Space and time cease to be dimensional; there
is no escape from the immediacy of the trauma, and the fundamental bonds to a
benign other are lost. (p. 88)
In considering the role that continuity, or a sense of time, has for individuals, Boulanger
draws again on Winnicott’s understanding of optimal development for a true self whereby the
baby is allowed a sense of ‘going on being’ by an attuned mother who creates an environment of
gentle intrusions, gentle rhythms around feeding, handling, and holding. During catastrophic
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dissociation, the invasion of our sense of going on being is violent. The experience is rendered
frozen and indigestible by both physiological (i.e neurologically, chemically based fight/flight
responses) and psychological processes, and in the aftermath, our ‘going on being’ is perpetually
hijacked by the traumatic memory’s reintroduction through nightmares, behavioral reenactments,
intrusive thoughts, and full-on flashbacks. The individual lives in a state of continual reaction, a
“meaningless now,” (p. 90) and thus continuous experience of oneself as a self through time is no
longer possible. This violation of time, Boulanger believes, also impacts an individual’s ability to
interact with others, to maintain a healthy sense of “self-other” differentiation, as again, our first
sense of time and continuity exists in an intersubjective field between mother and baby. Time is
a vital component of that containing original matrix, and when it is trespassed upon in adulthood,
“the consequences reverberate throughout the entire psychic system” (p. 91).
Disrupted affectivity in the face of massive trauma is, as Boulanger (2007) points out, a
result of the complex interplay between psychic terror and neurophysiological arousal—e.g., the
activation of the sympathetic nervous system and the flooding of cortisol that prepares an
organism for fight or flight. Krystal (1978, 1985) and others have also noted the effect of
alexithymia in the aftermath of near annihilation, which is the “failure to differentiate affects and
to use them as signals” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 7) One’s ability to know one’s responses—and
thereby to be in relation to a core self—is disturbed. Barraged by an activated nervous system
and unspeakable terror, numbness becomes the provisionally adaptive affect of choice, both in
the moment of trauma—which is how the body mobilizes to survive mortal threats—and
thereafter. But, of course, numbness is deadening. In reflecting on the experience with a combat
veteran Boulanger worked with she writes that “[t]he ‘I’ who experienced a range of feelings is
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gone, and with it the sense of ownership of experience. No longer punctuated by affect, his life
has become rote. He has, in effect, forfeited his subjectivity” (p. 92).
Boulanger also observes how many who have experienced such trauma continue later on
to seek out highly dangerous situations, as though to reenact the circumstances that led to their
collapsed self state. While classical psychoanalysis has often argued that this kind of repetition is
aimed at mastering the fear so that one can return to a balanced psychic state, she sees it
differently for adult onset trauma, as this repetition does not bring relief but reflects more of a
desperate attempt to puncture the state of numbness.
Disrupted affect, whether it is a sea of numbness or unwilled states of unbearable anxiety
from intrusive stimuli (e.g. burning toast causing the nervous system to react as though the house
is on fire) has grave consequences when it comes to human relations:
With the failure to register one’s own feelings comes both the inability to share
one’s affective state with an other, and the failure to appreciate the other’s
affectivity, which is the basis of intersubjective experience lying at the heart of
the capacity to feel related to others. (p. 94)

Traumatic Aloneness and Key Reconsiderations of Relational Practice with Adult Onset
Trauma
In Boulanger’s (2007) theoretical framework, the decimation of the intersubjective field
has profound, rippling effects on the individual. She notes that it was Ferenczi (1933) who first
observed that “traumatic aloneness” is what truly causes the psyche to implode (p. 193, as cited
in Boulanger, 2007, p. 96), and sees this kind of aloneness as stemming from three interrelated
areas: 1) the loss of internal structuring object relations; 2) the loss of external relations; and 3)
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the “imagined loss of membership in the human community” (p. 96). She observes that often in
cataclysmic trauma the “world of objects,” as Ferenczi called it (as cited in Frankle, 1998, p. 47),
vanishes and the individual’s desperate (and biologically ordained) efforts to survive render other
human beings obsolete. Holding this knowledge forces them up against what the Auschwitz
survivor Primo Levi (1958), who ultimately committed suicide, came to believe: “[I]n the end
everyone is desperately and ferociously alone” (as cited in Laub and Auerhan, 1989, p. 49).
When, as often happens with combat soldiers, a close friend is killed, this abrupt loss, this
destruction of a protective Other, can also have an implosive effect on all of the individual’s
object relations, and easily lead to repetitive, obsessive guilt. From this vantage point, “survivor
guilt” can be seen as a way to maintain connection to “both personal continuity and ties to lost
objects” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 99).
And although natural-made traumas can destroy faith in a predictable, ordered universe,
the internal object world seems to be particularly disrupted, Boulanger stresses, when the source
of the adult trauma is another human being, be that a rapist, a sniper or, perhaps most
disorienting of all, a child wrapped in a bomb. Boulanger points out that “how we were seen”
(presumably by an original loving caretaker) is “less relevant than how we are seen” (p. 100)—
i.e., as an object deemed not worth living. Often, in the absence of a benign internal world, the
individual will choose to identify with the abuser in order to escape the desolation of an
objectless world, becoming violent and aggressive themselves.
Upon “return” from massive trauma, the capacity of others to understand what has
happened is sorely tested, which of course exponentially increases a sense of isolation. As
Boulanger puts it, “With objectlessness comes meaninglessness; there is no internal other to
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guide expectations, no external other to understand the experience. The loss of the
intersubjective means that inner experience cannot be shared” (p. 102).
Relational theory’s emphasis on the co-construction in therapy of intersubjective space is
thus seriously challenged: how can there be an intersubjective, reparative space when, in the face
of massive trauma, one has lost one’s subjectivity? How can there be healing? In response to this
question, which is at the core of her book, Boulanger states that,
Insisting prematurely on an examination of a patient’s intersubjective experience,
when the patient’s internal object world has been so severely compromised by
recent reality, denies the patient an opportunity to explore the experience of the
collapsed self that should be foremost in the treatment. In the psychodynamic
treatment of adult onset trauma, the clinician’s task is to hold herself out as the
other to whom the patient can, at first tentatively, relate, and to tolerate how
irrelevant the patient may believe the entire process to be. The task is to tolerate a
feeling of unrelatedness without analyzing it. (p. 102)
The task, as Boulanger goes on to outline, is to first become a witness to the reality of
what has happened. This is not a co-constructing position, nor is it one that hinges on
intersubjective recognition. Indeed, Boulanger (2008) believes that forced “recognition” for what
is, in fact, unrecognizable to those who have not experienced adult onset trauma, is demeaning
and further damaging. Indeed, it is the therapist’s “involved otherness” (p. 652), that is precisely
what is called for. The therapist needs to function as both witness and container. In containing
the unspeakable horrors and refraining from analyzing them or drawing connections to earlier
experiences, the therapist begins to demonstrate that these fragmented sensations and states of
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being can be tolerated and slowly made sense of in their actuality. She describes how this
process unfolded in her harrowing work with one woman:
As she described her imprisonment and rape, the tension between joining and
observing—the tightrope that clinicians walk in every session—dissolved, I
became one with Celeste. My own boundaries were temporarily suspended as I
absorbed horror, disgust, humiliation, pain, and grief that were to haunt me for
several weeks. In my subsequent conversations with Celeste, I learned that
knowing that I was a separate person who had voluntarily stepped into her
experience, that I was prepared to bear witness to this experience, and bear up
under the experience began the process of reanimating her object world, and
reduced her sense of having been rendered untouchable. (p. 652)
As noted earlier, the inability to reflect or symbolize because “meanings are too
threatening to entertain” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 115) is precisely what holds people in a lockeddown, posttraumatic state. For Boulanger this, in combination with neuropsychological findings
of how memories are processed, accounts for the repetitive nature of posttraumatic nightmares,
the reliving upon reliving of the terror; the mind’s inability to actually convert the material into a
dream. “The unconscious has ground to a halt before the work of the Real and the creative
dreamwork of condensation and displacement is unavailable” (p. 120).
But again, by experiencing the therapist as an “other” who can “contain” and “detoxify”
that which has been too terrible to mentally entertain by the individual, the slow process of
trusting that another mind can “reflect on the experience without being deadened” begins, and
the individual gains back some of their own reflective processes—and thereby their connection
to a subjective center (p. 124).
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Living Narratives
In her work with survivors of adult onset trauma, Boulanger has noted time and time
again what she calls the “lifeless” trauma narrative. These narratives of traumatic experience are
lifeless because they are spoken from a dissociated state, a state that has lost the ability to
symbolize. They are “safe,” “repetitive,” “unelaborated” (p. 132), and spoken as if into a
vacuum. The other, the listener, is not called forth in the telling because, as Boulanger has
theorized, the other has, on a fundamental level, ceased to exist for the individual.
A living narrative, on the other hand, “is always dialogical” (p. 133) because it speaks to
an actual or imagined responsive other, someone “who is a subject in her own right, who listens
and is free to have her own thoughts and reactions to what she is hearing” (p. 134). A living
narrative, in other words, is predicated on the belief and felt experience of “an internal empathic
other” (Laug & Auerhahn, 1988, as cited in Boulanger, 2007, p. 134).
As previously noted, before a person can be helped to create a living narrative, the
therapist must demonstrate his or her ability to contain and survive the fragments of memory and
horror that have been experienced. But once that has been accomplished, Boulanger believes the
construction of a living narrative is critical, as it is a living narrative—with its implication of
responsive others—that will offer felt proof to the narrator that he “did not die and was not
disintegrated by the experience itself but by the fear of annihilation” (Kardiner, 1969, p. 254, as
cited in Boulanger, 2007, p. 137).
For Boulanger, these living narratives can be spoken or written, but the key is that their
construction is slowly deepened, elaborated upon, and mutually considered. The benefit
Boulanger sees to actually dictating or writing the narratives, and then slowly revising and
developing them, is that they can offer a way of “getting the memories outside” (p. 139). One
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patient who laboriously dictated to Boulanger at least four versions of her experience of escaping
from Ground Zero with her baby, articulated her eventual feeling of release in the following way:
“I don't have to remember all the details because they are written down” (p. 145). In the act of
transcribing this woman’s words, Boulanger saw herself as demonstrating again her capacity to
contain her memories without distorting or minimizing them. Understanding that I
was not damaged—that I could record what she was saying, process it and hand it
back to her in this case quite literally verbatim—allowed Jill to feel sufficiently
held that she could reflect further on what she had said. (p. 149)
It is at this point in therapy, when a living narrative is being constructed, that the vitality of an
intersubjective space comes again into play for survivors of adult onset trauma. The narrative,
although fundamentally that of the teller, is nonetheless co-constructed in that it is jointly
reflected upon, the process of creating it is jointly reflected upon, and the story is shifted back
and forth from teller to listener to teller again. In Boulanger’s experience the narrative, the text of
the trauma, then becomes a “transitional object, neither hers nor mine, both inside and outside at
the same time, constantly open to reflection and change” (p. 149). While Boulanger does not
hold out tidy endings to trauma that is so shattering to both body and soul, she does see a
pathway out of the most deadening aspects of it; a person cannot ever be the same as they were
before the trauma, but they can, in her mind, rejoin the living, human community.

Conclusion
Although Boulanger’s (2007) theory of adult onset trauma comes from a vastly differently
intellectual base—one that believes in the basic efficacy of psychodynamic thoughts and
practice—her belief in the constitutive power of narrative echoes White’s belief:
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Narrative is transfigured memory that, in its turn if it is a living narrative, further
transfigures memory. . . . In privileging narrative we privilege the successive
unfolding of increasingly complex experience. To privilege narrative is to
understand that to relate a traumatic memory (or any memory) is to construct the
memory, to formulate experience that has previously remained unformulated. (p.
149)
For Boulanger, the creation of a trauma narrative that with each telling gains more life, more rich
development and reanimated associations, is “an act of subordination” (p. 150) with respect to
the gaps in experience where new insight might be located. By formulating a deeper “personal
understanding” (p. 150) out of traumatic fragments—in White’s language this might be called a
preferred narrative—an individual can slowly reclaim the lost parts of him or herself. But this is
not a quick fix, in Boulanger’s view; this is not “short term therapy” (p. 150). Boulanger is
careful to emphasize that a living narrative is always an “open text” and that this “openness,” this
continual reconstitution, is key if the effects of massive trauma are to be lessened (p. 150).
Massive trauma, in her view, is an ever moving, often elusive target. It is always highly
individual. It cannot be solved with easy equations. As she notes,
When details of the trauma itself and of its consequences, have been categorized
and fixed in place, the response to terror is reduced to a formula. Rather than
encouraging understanding of the experience, it is forced into recognizable and
socially prescribed categories that discourage further investigation. In the very act
of being labeled, the subject located by this diagnosis has ceased to be a subject,
becoming instead an object of curiosity or a statistic. (p. 173)
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What then to make of the evolving construct of moral injury? What happens to our
understanding of this phenomenon as it is currently being defined and operationalized by clinical
social scientists, when it is viewed through the lens of White’s (2007) narrative theory and
Boulanger’s (2007) theory of adult onset trauma? Is moral injury a useful construct, a
desperately needed recognition of a reality that is experienced by combat veterans, one that has
come to a terrifying tipping point as evidenced by the number of veterans taking their own lives?
Or is it just one more label, one more way in which we, as a society and as participants in the
professional fields of mental health, avert our eyes? Or is there, perhaps, a third view: a tense
middle ground, a dialogic relationship between the ways in which the construct is useful and the
ways in which it is potentially dangerous? If that is the case, then we must also consider how
both narrative therapy and adult onset trauma theory might offer measures of relief to those
veterans who have entered a landscape of horror and trauma: those who have trespassed upon
other human beings and in so doing have trespassed upon themselves.
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Chapter V
Discussion

AIAI! Who would have thought the name
I was given would sound out my misery?
Aias! Ajax! Agony!
—Sophocles, Ajax
I learned that words make a difference. It’s easier to cope with a kicked
bucket than a corpse; if it isn’t human, it doesn’t matter much if it’s dead.
And so a VC nurse, fried by napalm, was a crispy critter. A Vietnamese
baby, which lay nearby, was a roasted peanut. “Just a crunchie munchie,”
Rat Kiley said as he stepped over the body.
—Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried

Introduction
Words do make a difference—the word Ajax, after all, is etymologically “the sound of a
blood-curdling scream, a cry of anguish and despair” (Doerries, 2015, p. 106)—and whether it is
to shield oneself from trauma or to make meaning of trauma or to simply put sound to trauma,
the transportive function of words is something that revolutionary thinkers from Sophocles to
Shakespeare to Freud have all demonstrated. Narrative theorist Michael White (2007) and adult
onset trauma theorist Ghislaine Boulanger (2007) also profoundly believe in the therapeutic
efficacy of words and the life-changing narratives those words can create. To that end, applying
the theories and insights of White’s narrative practice and Boulanger’s adult onset trauma theory
to the current clinical construct of moral injury will be the basis of this chapter.
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Moral injury in combat veterans, whether one favors Shay’s (1994, 2014) definition,
which highlights the betrayal of others or Litz et al.’s (2009) definition, which considers more
specifically the self-betrayal and self-transgressions related to perpetration, is a phenomenon that
shatters one’s sense of trust in one’s world and oneself. My use of trust here is multifaceted and
includes trust in oneself—i.e., one’s mind, one’s perceptions, one’s beliefs, one’s agency—as
well as trust in others: a single individual, like a therapist, or a roomful of listeners in an
auditorium. Finding ways to restore that trust is, in my opinion, the key to moral repair, and it
seems to me that both narrative practice and adult onset trauma theory offer different and yet
complementary pathways to such healing.
Speaking generally, I would argue that narrative theory is particularly (although by no
means exclusively) suited to addressing the socio-cultural aspects of moral injury: the betrayals
and injuries incurred by dominant, pathologizing discourses, which can be disseminated not only
by military commanders and civilians, but by mental health workers as well. As Shay (2014)
notes,
At its worst our educational system produces counselors, psychiatrists,
psychologists, and therapists who resemble museum-goers whose whole
experience consists of mentally saying, “That’s cubist! . . . That’s El Greco!” and
who never see anything they’ve looked at. “Just listen,” say the veterans when
telling mental health professionals what they need to know to work with them,
and I believe that is their wish for the general public as well. (p. 5)
Narrative practice, of course, also urges listening: listening for preferred storylines, for
subjugated knowledges, for unique outcomes. This foundational emphasis on listening—and by
extension moving away from realms of expert knowledge— along with a guiding belief in the
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defining power of analogy and of de-pathologizing receiving contexts, positions narrative
therapy as an important first step in the societal re-integration of combat veterans.
On the other hand, adult onset trauma as Boulanger (2007) defines it, is particularly
suited to comprehending the psychodynamic components of moral injury: the specific, visceral
experience and ensuing symptomology of having a self shattered by catastrophic violence that
one has either witnessed or perpetrated—or, as is usually the case for combat veterans, witnessed
and perpetrated. The symptomology and behavior changes related to moral injury that Nash &
Litz (2013) and others (Farnsworth et al., 2014, Drescher, K.D. et al., 2011) have been
painstakingly cataloguing in recent years bears repeating at this juncture for its sobering
magnitude:
Reported social and behavioral problems possibly associated with moral injury
ranged from social withdrawal and alienation to aggression, misconduct, and
sociopathy. Possible spiritual and existential symptoms included loss of religious
faith, loss of trust in morality, loss of meaning, and fatalism. Possible
psychological symptoms included depression, anxiety, and anger, while the
characteristic self-depreciating emotions and cognitions thought to be associated
with moral injury included shame, guilt, self-loathing, and feeling damaged.
(Nash & Litz, 2013, p. 369)
Given the magnitude of war-related psychological trauma—the fact that twenty-two veterans on
average commit suicide every day, which amounts to almost one self-inflicted death per hour
(Veterans Affairs, 2012, as cited in Doerries, 2015, p. 4)—attending to both the socio-cultural
and the psychodynamic dimensions of that trauma is crucial for social workers engaged in
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mental health treatment with combat veterans. Neglecting either of these components potentially
creates further injury.
Freud, in his essay, “Some Character-Types met with in Psycho-Analytic Work” (1916),
turned to the texts of Shakespeare and Ibsen in order to illustrate his clinical points because of
“the wealth of their knowledge of the mind” (p. 317). I too am compelled by the news about
human beings that artists—be they writers or painters or actors or directors—have to offer the
mental health field. In what follows, I will first briefly note several contemporary literary texts as
a means of highlighting narrative theory’s applicability to moral injury, and then turn to Bryan
Doerries’ public health organization, Theater of War, as an example of the way in which
narrative practice may be brought to bear on moral injury. In the final section of the chapter, I
will try to provide a more nuanced account of moral injury by reading Sophocles’ Ajax through
the lens of adult onset trauma theory.

Defining moral injury: a narrative tension
At the outset, it is worth registering that narrative theory and practice, particularly as
conceived of by White (2007), sit uneasily with the constructing and codifying of moral injury
that is currently taking place in the social science circles connected to the Department of
Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defense. Such clear-cut defining is, from the point of
view of narrative practice, an example of positivism, a technique of power whereby one group
(in this case the psychologists who are primarily defining the terms) holds knowledge of this
“injury,” which by extension gives it power over those who “have” this “injury.” Even if one
does not fully subscribe to narrative practice, this caution around defining a state of being that is
ancient and utterly individual is warranted. If one were to use a narrative analogy to further this
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point, one might say that while there are a limited number of plots in the world with regard to
moral injury—plots that involve loss of trust and shame and despair—there are an infinite
number of points of view as to what it like to actually experience moral injury. Narrative practice
is a therapeutic approach that seeks to privilege the particular experience, the lived experience,
and to resist soul-stultifying general narratives.
That said, I should note too that at the moment, at least, the social scientists who are
constructing the term are careful to specify, as Farnsworth et al. (2014) note, that they are “not
advocating for a new disorder or descriptive diagnosis. Instead, Litz et al.’s (2009) definition
affirms the existence of traumatic events that extend beyond the realm of fear and imminent
threat to one’s physical safety” (p. 250). To dismiss the research and construct-building of moral
injury from the social science realm as pathologizing discourse would be too easy: I firmly
believe that Brett Litz (2009, 2013) and his colleagues see the psychological trauma of returning
veterans as a full-blown crisis, and are mindful of constructing this phenomenon as an injury
rather than an disorder. Their point of view is grounded in cognitive behavorialism; White’s
(2007) and other narrative practitioners’ points of view are grounded in a post-modern, postconstructivist model. Both frameworks are useful, and indeed, the complexity of moral injury
seems to require a multi-directional approach. A balanced view can place the questioning of
expert opinion and dominant narratives in a dialogic relationship with the evolving research and
measures for moral injury and repair of moral injury.

“Thank you for your service”
Upending dominant discourses and re-authoring narratives that can flourish outside of
those totalizing storylines is, as I’ve noted, a key technique of narrative practice. And if, as I’ve
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also suggested, narrative theory and practice are particularly well-suited to addressing the sociocultural components of moral injury, it is then worth highlighting again several of the sociocultural phenomena that might in fact be morally injurious for veterans. Farnsworth et al. (2014)
note that the re-entry period from deployment is a particularly “risky” (p. 255) time for soldiers
and veterans, as they are moving from a military world with one set of moral guidelines to a
civilian world with another set. “Whereas morality during deployment may be defined in large
part with respect to the survival of the unit,” Farnsworth et al. (2014) write, “civilian morality is
comprised of a larger number of comparatively trivial moral issues, virtually none of which
condones lethal violence or aggression” (p. 255).
Shay (1994) highlights the morally injurious actions of military commanders and the
government for the combat soldier: “Lies and euphemisms by the soldier’s own military
superiors and civilian leaders of course undermine social trust by destroying confidence in
language” (p. 34). Shay places particular emphasis on the destructive powers of the “enemy”
with regard to social trust: “The enemy does severe damage to a part of mental function that is
critical to the maintenance of social trust: the trustworthiness of perception” (p. 43).
The humanities scholar Robert Meagher (2014), while disputing neither the difference
between military and civilian moral codes nor the profound injury of enemy action, sees the issue
as much larger and insidious, rooted as it is, in the thousand-year-old tradition of “just war.”
This is, undoubtedly the ground that the social scientists at the Department of Veterans Affairs
and the Department of Defense, tread uneasily upon; it is the component of moral injury that
they cannot sufficiently address, as Meagher’s thesis disrupts the whole basis for our recent—as
well as our historical—conflicts. As he notes,
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[t]he deceptive and destructive core of the Christian just war doctrine can
be stated very simply. It is the claim that wars, or at least some wars, and
all the killing and destruction they entail, are—in addition to being
necessary—good and right, even virtuous and meritorious, pleasing in the
sight of God. (p. xiv)
Killing, according to this doctrine—according to what narrative practice would identify as a
dominant narrative—is “radically distinct” from murder; it is “pure” (p. xiv). And yet, as
Meagher points out, “[t]he truth is that just war theory has never made sense to those with blood
on their hands nor to those whose blood it was. . . . So long as we cling to the moral justification
of our wars we remain blind to the moral injury they inflict” (p. xvi).
The “subjugated knowledge” (White & Epson, 1990, p. 25) of veterans “with blood on
their hands” is too often obscured by totalizing storylines about spreading democracy, about
America’s identity as the world’s peacekeeper, and about notions of heroism and missions
accomplished. This is why the dissonance, as the cognitive behavorialists might say, that occurs
for returning veterans who are congratulated for their heroism or thanked for their service is so
painful and disorienting; it reflects a storyline or a “truth” that others are imposing on them and
that is fundamentally not in synch with their actual lived experience. Many of the men I sat with
in a Vietnam veteran’s group during my internship at the VA expressed their loathing of being
called heroes. They felt they had done their job, followed orders. The notion of heroism, in the
face of so much brutality, was unpleasant, even shaming, because it implied, in the person doing
the congratulating, a blindness to the horrors of war, and was therefore a negation of the
veteran’s actual experience.
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Language, as White (2007) never tires of reminding us, is constitutive: and again, one has
only to think of words like pride or courage with regard to going off to a “just war” to see the
dominant narratives that are embedded in those words—and that, from a narrative perspective,
determine the choices made by soldiers in and out of combat. The contemporary novelist Ben
Fountain underscores this very point in Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk (2012), a scathing look
at the ways in which the civilian world mouths support for troops but ultimately turns away from
their suffering. The following is passage is from a scene in which Billy, the Marine at the center
of the novel, is being celebrated by the billionaire owner of a football team; all he hears,
however, is moral dissonance:
Pride, he says, but like a tape played too slow the word warps and fattens
in Billy’s ear, ppprrrrRRIIiiiddde. Then courage, cooooOUURRraaage.
Service, sssserrrRRRrvvviccce. SsssacccrRRRIiiifffice.
HooooONNnnorrrr. DeeeterrRRRminaaaAAAtion. (p. 111)
At an earlier moment, Billy reflects on how much death his Bravo Company has seen and
comprehends another aspect of language-related moral dissonance:
[G]iven the masculine standard America has set for itself it is interesting
how few actually qualify. Why we fight, yo, who is this we? Here in the
chicken-hawk nation of blowhards and bluffers, Bravo always has the ace
of bloods up its sleeve. (p. 66)
There is a relentlessly advertised “we” that is part of the dominant narrative about going to war,
but that “we” swiftly disappears in the particularities of war. The veteran, like the central figure
in Powers’ novel, is not a we but simply a he, left alone to “account for what he’s done.”
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From a narrative perspective, simply exposing what White would call the “techniques of
power” that are apparent in dominant storylines and the language of just war, is an act of
therapeutic “insurrection” (White & Epson, 1990, p. 32), and would in itself serve to externalize
some of the “problem” of moral injury. And once there is some externalized space between the
problem and the person, there is room for movement and re-authorship. As White & Epson note,
Once these techniques have been identified, unique outcomes can be
located through an investigation of those occasions when the person could
have subjected himself or others to these techniques but refused to do so. .
. . Other examples of defiance can be identified and linked together to
provide a historical account of resistance. . . . In identifying these unique
outcomes, subjugation to the techniques of “normalizing judgment”—the
evaluation and classification of person and relationships according to
dominant “truths”—can be effectively challenged. “Docile bodies”
become “enlivened spirits.” (p. 31)
While White (2007) believed these narrative techniques could be highly effective in one-on-one
settings, he came to recognize what he saw as an even greater therapeutic value for a person if an
audience was also “engaged” in this performance of destabilizing dominant “truths” and
unearthing preferred meanings (p. 178).
As noted in my earlier chapter, his idea of definitional ceremonies developed out of his
observation that the development of rich personal narratives so often “contradicted . . . socially
constructed norms” (p. 179); he saw how critical it was for these new, norm-challenging
narratives to be witnessed and “verified” by a group of others. As he points out, referencing
Myerhoff (1982, p. 284),
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[t]he prominence given to “collective self-definitions,” to the imperative of
“appearing before others,” to “garnering witnesses to one’s worth, vitality, and
being,” and to “proclaiming an interpretation to an audience not otherwise
available” emphasizes the central significance of the contribution of the audience
in these definitional ceremonies. It was the audience response to the stories told
and performed in these forums that was verifying of these stories. It was the
audience’s acknowledgment of the identity claims expressed in these stories that
was authenticating of these identity claims. It was the audience recognition of
these stories that so significantly contributed to the community members’
achieving a sense of feeling at one with their claims about their lives. In the
context of these forums, the audience found themselves “participating in someone
else’s drama” and becoming “witnesses who push a plot forward almost
unwittingly.” (p. 183)
It is the reverberating space between individual and community, the emotional exchange
between part and whole that White came to believe had such transcendent—cathartic—potential
for healing. Shay (1994), as I noted in Chapter II, also believes that it is precisely this kind of
“communalization of trauma” (p. 4), this collective performance of listening to tragedy, that is
necessary for the repair of moral injury. Healing, as Shay argues the ancient Greeks knew well,
depends on “being able safely to tell the story to someone who is listening and who can be
trusted to retell it truthfully to others in the community” (p. 4). His book Achilles in Vietnam
(1994), ends with a cri de coeur for the mental health community to find new ways, beyond
insular veteran support groups, to truly communalize the trauma of war: “Combat veterans and
American citizenry should meet together face to face in daylight, and listen, and watch, and
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weep, just as citizen soldiers of ancient Athens did in the theater at the foot of the Acropolis” (p.
194).
In 2008, at the invitation of Captain William Nash—who one year later would publish
with Bret Litz and other colleagues their landmark article on moral injury and moral repair—
Bryan Doerries (2015) was able to do just that. Nash invited Doerries to a Marine base in San
Diego and Doerries staged his first Theater of War reading in front of four hundred Marines
(Doerries, 2015). Doerries demonstrated, unwittingly perhaps, just how relevant and effective an
adaptation of White’s definitional ceremonies could be as a model of therapeutic repair for moral
injury.

Theater of War
In presenting readings from Sophocles’ Ajax and Philoctetes to combined military and
civilian audiences, Theater of War’s (2015) mission is straightforward:
to de-stigmatize psychological injury, increase awareness of post-deployment
psychological health issues, disseminate information regarding available
resources, and foster greater family, community, and troop resilience. Using
Sophocles’ plays to forge a common vocabulary for openly discussing the impact
of war on individuals, families, and communities, these events [are] aimed at
generating compassion and understanding between diverse audiences.
Doerries, who first immersed himself in Old Testament languages as an undergraduate, is
a writer, actor, director and translator (all of the Sophocles texts used by Theater of War are his
translations), as well as a “self-proclaimed evangelist for classical literature and its relevance to
our lives today” (Doerries, 2015, p, 8). He is adamant about the emotional, spiritual, and

85

therapeutic value of Greek tragedies, subscribing to the view, as is stated in the Theater of War
literature, “that ancient Greek drama was a form of storytelling, communal therapy, and ritual
reintegration for combat veterans by combat veterans” (Outside the Wire, 2015). Sophocles, as
Doerries (2015) points out, was himself a retired general and was writing during a war-striated
period in which the Greeks had been in bloody battle for twenty years with the Spartans (p. 57).
Crucial to remember is that Sophocles’ audiences (and his performers) would have been made up
of soldiers and veterans. He was a veteran writing for veterans. And what were these veterans
watching? In the case of Ajax, the mental plummeting, the berserk, bloody outburst, the crippling
shame, and the ultimate suicide of a man who had been considered one of the greatest warriors in
the Greek army. As Doerries notes in his book, The Theater of War (2015), just published this
fall,
At the center of the tragedy is the suicide of a combat veteran, one of the most
graphic and iconic depictions of suicide in all of Western literature. Sophocles
staged the violence of Ajax’s death mere feet from where the generals sat in the
audience in the ancient Theater of Dionysus. But he did something else equally
remarkable: he cleared the skene or “stage,” of all other characters and took the
audience inside the mind of a person who is actively contemplating suicide, deep
inside the insidious logic that leads him to end his own life. (p. 96)
Theater of War is not theater of the kind that American audiences are used to: it is, Doerries
writes, “the tool that we’re using to catalyze the discussion.” What Doerries has learned is that
“when people see their own private struggles reflected in an ancient story, they open up and
share some of the most personal and profound things—things they’ve never said out loud—let
alone in front of an audience” (Doerries, 2013).
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As a public health project, Theater of War has a very specific aesthetic for its readings,
starting with the fact that all artifice is stripped away. There are no props, no costumes, and no
set. The actors wear their street clothes. They sit behind a table with scripts and bottles of water
in front of them. There are usually only two or three actors on stage, accompanied by Doerries,
who reads minor parts. The auditorium lights are fully turned up on the actors—and on the
audience. Doerries has a carefully considered rationale for this set-up: “by stripping the
performance to its bare essentials, by focusing the actors’ considerable talents upon the power of
the spoken word . . . I hoped to deliver the plays in their purest and most efficacious form” (p.
74).
Once the audience members have settled in their seats, Doerries offers a few opening
remarks to set the scene before sitting down at the table with the actors. There is a pause—and
then, always, BAM: in full character, full agony, the scene is on. Doerries says that he
intentionally starts his scenes at full tilt, with an actor, depending on whether he/she is reading
Philoctotes, Ajax, or Tesmessa, howling, shouting, or weeping. The audience is, invariably,
riveted by this instant transformation, this shocking (as the street clothes, the water bottles, and
the full lighting work to disarm expectations) descent into raw, emotional turmoil:
AJAX: I call upon the Furies,
those long-striding
dread maidens who
avenge humans and
see to their endless
suffering: witness
how the generals
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have destroyed me!

Train your eyes on
those evil men,
snatch them with
your talons and,
just as I die at
my own hands,
may they also be
murdered by their
own flesh and blood.
It’s feeding time! (Doerries, 2015, pp. 80-81)
Theater of War has reached thousands of service members and has held readings around
the world, from Brooklyn to Scandinavia to Kuwait (Doerries, 2015, p. 7); media outlets from
The New York Times to the Atlantic to the PBS Newshour have featured Theater of War; and at
this point, Doerries has a stable of well-known theater and film actors at his disposal, including
David Straitharn, Paul Giamatti, Blythe Danner, Giancarlo Esposito, Frances McDormand,
Elizabeth Marvel, Jake Gyllenhaal, John Turturro, Amy Ryan and Martin Sheen (Outside the
Wire, 2015). But just as Theater of War is not about theater in the usual way, it is also not about
these famous actors: as soon as the reading, which usually lasts about an hour, is over, the actors
quickly exit the stage. Their seats are taken by a panel of pre-selected community members,
usually a combination of veterans and local mental health workers who have been asked prior to
the reading to watch and be prepared to respond, from the gut, to what they have heard. Just like
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White’s (2007) outsider witnesses, they are instructed not to come with prepared notes, not to
take notes, but to just listen (Doerries, 2015).
After the panel members have responded to what they have seen—Doerries considers
them to be in the role of “the ancient Greek chorus, intermediaries between the plays and the
audience” (p. 83)—Doerries then turns to the audience which, through advertising, recruiting,
and word of mouth, has been filled with a diverse combination of active duty troops, veterans,
and civilians. Doerries has several questions planned out for the discussion portion of the
production, but almost always begins with this one: Why do you think Sophocles wrote this play?
(Doerries, 2015, p. 4).
From this point on, the audience is in charge. The actors often move around the
auditorium, delivering the microphone to each new speaker. In some venues, standing
microphones are set up in the aisles. The first time Doerries staged his reading, for the 400
Marines in San Diego, they allotted 45 minutes for this discussion period. The conversation
lasted three hours and had to finally be cut off after midnight (Doerries, 2015, p. 87).
Acting as part MC, part therapeutic conduit, Doerries asks more questions, builds off of
the audiences words and language. In response to Doerries’s question about why Sophocles
wrote Ajax, one enlisted soldier, as Doerries recounts in his book, declared, “in order to boost
morale.” Doerries then asked him, “What is morale-boosting about watching a decorated warrior
descend into madness and take his own life?” The soldier replied, “It’s the truth, and we’re all
here watching it together” (Doerries, 2015, p. 4.)
As Doerries notes,
The soldier had highlighted something hidden within Ajax: a message for
our time. Sophocles didn’t whitewash the horrors of war. This wasn’t
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government-sponsored propaganda. Nor was his play an act of protest. It
was the unvarnished truth. And by presenting the truth of war to combat
veterans, he thought to give voice to their secret struggles and to convey to
them that they were not alone. (p. 4)
In other words, we are back to Shay’s (1994) “communalization of trauma” to heal moral injury
and to White’s (2007) notion that definitional ceremonies “have the potential to be highly
resonant” (p. 189). It is precisely this resonance that “contributes significantly to rich story
development, to a stronger familiarity with what one accords value to in life, and to the erosion
and displacement of various negative conclusions about one’s life and identity” (White, 2007, p.
189).

Theater of War Theory
Over and over again, Doerries (2015) has found that Sophocles’ plays speak to the core
experience of soldiers, veterans, and their loved ones. At one event, as he recounts, the wife of a
Navy Seal stood up and declared, “My husband went away four times to war, and each time he
returned, like Ajax, dragging invisible bodies into our house. The war came home with him. And
to quote from the play, ‘Our home is a slaughterhouse’” (p. 83).
In his efforts to reach as many soldiers and veterans as possible, Doerries has had to
counter “two pervasive knee-jerk concerns” (p. 104), from mental health professionals who work
with veterans: first, that the plays would be retraumatizing for veterans and exacerbate symptoms
of depression and suicidality; and second, that the plays would “fly straight over the heads of
those in the lower enlisted ranks” (p. 105).
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While Doerries obviously does not know the specifics of the reactions, immediate or
delayed, that his audiences bring home (there has not, as yet, been any formal research on the
effects of Theater of War for veteran audiences), he has found neither of the concerns to be borne
out—and he has a theory as to why. Like White (2007), Doerries returns to Aristotle’s writings
on tragedy and catharsis, specifically the idea that tragedies are graphic illustrations of
“suffering.” By bringing about a collective response in the audience to this suffering, by calling
forth powerful, shared emotions, a state of catharsis—a cleansed and purified state—is achieved
(p. 37). Doerries takes issue with the well-worn idea of the “tragic flaw” of characters in Greek
tragedies, as he sees that eliciting in audiences a feeling of judgment rather than empathy. But it
is empathy that moves us from one place to another—perhaps from a place of judgment (self or
other inflicted) to one of understanding. As Doerries notes,
tragedies are not designed to teach us morals, but rather to validate our
moral distress at living in a universe in which many of our actions and
choices are influenced by external powers far beyond our
comprehension—such as luck, fate chance, governments, families,
politics, and genetics. (p. 13)
Citing the term, allostatic load, which was coined by psychologists at Yale and refers to
the “physical strain of the body’s stress response…upon the cardiovascular system” (p. 37),
Doerries also makes the case that perhaps tragedy, with its cathartic release and the emotional
movement it induces from a state of “pity and fear” (p. 37) to one of purification, was an ancient
therapeutic system for recalibrating the autonomic nervous system; perhaps tragedy, as he
argues, is “a powerful tool for positive change, one whose vast and untapped potential for
propagating healthy responses to stress remains wholly underestimated” (p. 38).
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And I would venture further that there might be a metric explanation, a connection, for
example, between the rhythms of our nervous system and the rhythms of verse. As the poet
Robert Wallace (1987) observes,
Why do we live in square rooms? Why do we draw mechanical doodles when we
are bored? Why do we tap our feet to music? Perhaps there is a profound link
between the meter of verse and the human pulse, the rhythm of life itself—te
TUM te TUM te TUM. The rhythmical impulse runs deep in us. (Wallace, 1987, p.
8)

Theater of War and Narrative Practice
It is evident to me that Theater of War is therapeutically beneficial because it hinges,
consciously or unconsciously, on so many of the basic foundations of White’s (2007) narrative
theory and practice: exposure and therefore externalization of dominant, pathologizing discourse;
re-authoring in the form of the rich story development of preferred narratives by the soldier and
veteran audience; re-membering (Ajax and Philoctetes join the membership of veteran’s lives);
and, of course, definitional ceremonies. Here the overlaps are striking. For example, Doerries’
structure for the performances is essentially identical to White’s structure of “1. The telling of
the significant narrative by the person. 2. The re-telling of the narrative by those invited to be
present as outsider witnesses. 3. The retelling of the outsider witnesses’ retelling by the person”
(White, 2007, p. 185). The only difference is that the figure for whom the ceremony is performed
is, in Theater of War, first signified by the character at the center of the tragedy, by Ajax, say,
and then later, in accordance with White’s third step, the central figure is represented by the
soldier and veteran members of the audience. White’s careful selection of outsider witnesses is
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echoed in Doerries selection of his panel-Chorus, as well as his dedication to making sure the
audience is a diverse mix of civilians, i.e. those who need to listen and veterans, i.e. those who
need to speak.
The fact that Theater of War is a performance of Greek tragedy and perforce employs the
ancient technique of catharsis is what enables the audience—the outsider witnesses—to adhere,
more or less, to White’s “four categories of inquiry” for his outsider witnesses: our focus can’t
help but be on Ajax’s howling expressions, the linguistically called forth images of bloody
carcasses, the personal resonances (as a veteran, a spouse, a witness), and on transport. As
White notes, “It is rarely possible to be an audience to the powerful dramas of other people’s
lives without this moving us in some way” (p. 191).
For Litz et al. (2009), one of the most lethal aspects of moral injury is the intractability of
beliefs about the damaged or ‘flawed’ self that has perpetrated or witnessed profound violations:
If the attribution about the cause of a transgression is global (i.e., not
context dependent), internal (i.e. seen as a disposition or character flaw),
and stable (i.e. enduring; the experience of being tainted), these beliefs
will cause enduring moral emotions such as shame and anxiety due to
uncertainty and the expectation of being judged eventually. If these
aversive emotional and psychological experiences lead to withdrawal (and
concealment) then the service member is thwarted from corrective and
repairing experience (that otherwise would temper and counter attributions
and foster self-forgiveness) with peers, leaders, significant others, faith
communities, (if applicable), and the culture at large. (p. 700)
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This intractability is, as Litz et al. (2009) argue in their model for moral repair, precisely why
soldiers and veterans “need to have an equally intense real-time encounter with a countervailing
experiencing” (p. 701).
The definitional ceremony that Theater of War, in fact, is, provides, as I hope I have
made clear, just such an “intense” and “countervailing” experience. Indeed, it is Theater of
War’s ability to create a platform for the storying of preferred experience, to offer outsider
witness retellings, and to temporarily level the hierarchies and boundaries—between generals
and the enlisted, between veterans and civilians—that works so powerfully against the aspect of
moral injury that Litz et al. (2009) see as an “over-accommodation . . . of expectations of
injustice” (p. 701). The resultant co-constructed narrative of shared understanding around the
burden of war, be that the killing of others or the wish to kill oneself, in place of disavowing,
dominant narratives about honor, sacrifice, war-induced psychosis or suicidality, is immensely
validating. As one general succinctly put it after listening to a Theater of War performance,
Perhaps Sophocles wrote these plays because he was in the minority with
regard to the compassion he felt for the warriors in his community who
were struggling with the issues he portrayed in his plays. Perhaps
Sophocles wrote these plays to comfort the afflicted and afflict the
comfortable. (Doerries, 2015, p. 108)

And Yet: Examining Moral Injury Through the Lens of Adult-Onset Trauma Theory
Narrative practice—and by extension Theater of War—is, as I have argued, wellpositioned to address some of the socially embedded wounds of moral injury, the collective and
individual psychic damage that comes from betrayals of “social trust” (Shay, 2013, p. 186) and
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the “shrinking of viable social collaborators” (Farnsworth et al., 2014, p. 255). And yet, the
whirling dervish of moral injury spins, as Litz et al. (2009) point out, into many areas of
distress—social, behavioral, spiritual, and psychological—and a multi-modal approach to
understanding the trauma of this phenomenon is critical. To that end, I will now turn to
Boulanger’s (2007) theory of adult onset trauma and to the morally injured figure of Ajax. By
providing a close reading of Ajax’s experience, my intent is to both create a visceral, experiencenear understanding of moral injury as a form of adult onset trauma, as well as to demonstrate the
important clinical implications of Boulanger’s theory. Moral injury shatters social trust; it also,
certainly, shatters the self, and adult onset trauma theory offers an entry point to the “momentous
and very private experiences” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 7) of this phenomenon.

The moral injury of Ajax
At the play’s opening, Athena, goddess of wisdom appears to tell Odysseus how Ajax,
considered by all to be the strongest of the Greek warriors, has gone insane in the night, and has
butchered a collection of livestock. Ajax, we learn, was enraged with Odysseus and the other
Greek leaders because the cherished armor of Achilles had been given to Odysseus rather than to
him. Ajax considered himself more deserving: not only was he the best warrior, but Achilles was
also his dear friend. Enraged by this compounded betrayal, he sets out to murder Odysseus. He is
waylaid by Athena, who blinds him with madness so that he kills the livestock rather then the
men. Upon awakening the next day from this madness, Ajax is consumed with shame and guilt
over his bloody deeds and is reduced to alternately catatonic and weeping states. He kills himself
at the beginning of Act II by impaling himself on his sword—the very source of his heroic
legacy.
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If one is to go by Litz et al.’s model (2009), which conceives of moral injury as
“participating in or witnessing inhumane or cruel actions, failing to prevent the immoral acts of
others, as well as engaging in subtle actions or experiencing reactions that, upon reflection,
transgress a moral code,” then Ajax, tragically, scores on all fronts. He has participated in
inhumane actions, he has failed to prevent immoral acts, he has transgressed his own moral code.
Ajax’s symptomology, from within a moral injury framework, could be said to include:
1. Aggression and sociopathy: “He attacked the horned beasts, smashing/Their spines,
then hacking out a circle of carcasses/He thought he had hold of the two sons of Atreus/And was
slaughtering them with his own hands” (55-58).
2. Alienation and social withdrawal: “And what now? The gods revile me/That is certain.
I am despised by the Greeks/And hated by this plain of Troy. Should I go home? Abandon these
moorings?” (457-60).
3. Depression: “Now he has been laid low by this evil/He won’t eat or drink or say
anything (321-322).
4. Shame: “Look at the valiant man! The brave heart!/The one who unflinchingly faced
the enemy!/You see the great deeds I have done to harmless beasts?/O, the ridicule runs riot
against me!” (364-367).
5. Suicidality: “I also pray to Hermes/Guide to the Underworld, to help me fall on my
sword/without a struggle—one quick, sharp thrust” (831-33).

Traumatic Reality
The “divine madness” by means of which Athena overpowers Ajax and the gruesome
destruction of the livestock that ensues can be read, as Doerries (2015) points out, as a
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dramatization of the “psychological damage of war” (p. 93). The classical psychoanalyst Meyer
Lanksy (1996), who has written extensively about shame, regards Sophocles as “the poet of
shame” and Ajax’s mental collapse as an instance of “dissociated narcissistic rage that arises
directly from an experience of shame and results in an escalation of both external and internal
shame conflicts” (p. 766). His view is a break from previous psychoanalytic readings of the text,
which emphasized Ajax’s rage as a function of psychosis.
Boulanger (2007), interestingly, does not explicitly name “shame” in her book, although
it seems implicit in her description of the experience of catastrophic dissociation: there is a
global collapse of self, hence the self is globally damaged and unworthy. As she writes,
“[c]atastrophic experience in adulthood brings each aspect of the core self into question,
shattering confidence in the invariants that previously formed and informed experience,
jeopardizing the self that cannot, in fact, be separated from experience” (p. 80).
From an adult onset trauma theory perspective, Ajax’s bloody rampage, I would argue,
can be seen as a distillation of catastrophic dissociation in the face of extreme trauma—a
traumatic trifecta, in this case, of years of combat, the death of Achilles, and the betrayal by the
Greek generals. It is the moment in which Ajax’s agency, physical cohesion, continuity, and
affect, the crucial components for a sense of self within this framework, are irreparably damaged.
Boulanger notes that such dissociation is an “emergent, complex, and evolving process” (p. 79),
and indeed, in the aftermath of his bloodbath, Ajax is left in a “traumatic reality” (p. 59), in
Lacan’s gap “entre deux morts” (p. 38). This is an emotionally suffocating, death-in-life in place
where there is, as Boulanger observes of this state, “an emptiness that cannot be contained or
defined or reasoned away” (p. 38). Or, as Ajax puts it,
Oh!
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Darkness is now my only light;
The gloom of the Underworld
Shines for me. Take me!
I have lost the right to look for
Any help from gods or men. (393-396)
Sophocles’ text, with its repetition of Ajax’s carnage (we hear extended gory details three
times, first from Odysseus, then Athena, and finally Tecmessa) makes manifest this traumatic
reality: Ajax’s massacre takes place before the play opens, so the text quite literally in this
repetition, gives us post-traumatic flashbacks, effectively merging form and content. It is an
illustration, to re-quote Boulanger, who is referencing Winnicott, of “a reality that sticks in the
psychic craw and cannot be dislodged. The survivor is always choking on the fact of it, always
fearing a repetition of the breakdown that has already happened” (p. 59). This, I would argue, is
underscored by the intensity of the descriptions of the slaughter—arguably the most vivid
sections of the entire play—through the insistent use of action words like “attacked,”
“smashing,” “hacking,” “slaughtering,” “hurling,” “butchered,” “ripped,” “flogged,” and
“stinging.” These words attest to what Ajax is doing to the cattle, but they also reflect, perhaps,
the fragmented, terrifying disarray of his internal state; again, the “emergent, complex, and
evolving process” of catastrophic dissociation.

Agency, Physical Cohesion, Continuity, and Affectivity Applied
Ajax’s loss of agency is introduced by Sophocles in the first moment of the play: a
goddess, an unknowable, mercurial force from above has blinded him with madness, and in a
split second, Ajax has descended from his secure, renowned identity as a powerful warrior, a
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man who knows his own mind, into the state of a crazed puppet. He had, as Athena tells us,
actually reached the doors to Odysseus’s tent with his awareness intact. But then, she says, “I
held him at the brink of his deadly moment of joy/deluding his eyes with visions of his own
obsession” (52-53). As Boulanger (2007) notes, dissociation “is not a choice; it is imposed by an
overwhelmed psyche that is attempting to protect itself from further harm” (p. 82).
While Ajax himself locates his great shame in his inability to follow through with his
intent to kill the Greeks, mistaking animals for them, it’s also possible to read his slaughtering of
the animals as an example of the fundamental inhumanity of war, in which men do indeed, as the
My Lai massacre and countless other war atrocities attest, kill in states of catastrophic
dissociation brought on by experiences where they have been brought to the brink of either their
own or someone else’s annihilation. Rage, as Lansky (1996) implies, especially over the loss of
comrades, certainly plays a part in this, but it can also be traced back to the amygdala-controlled
“fight” response that is initiated when the body is in danger. The overwhelmingness of such
experiences is amplified, after the fact, by waves of helplessness—not least of which is the
helplessness in attempting to make sense or meaning of the traumatic events and memories.
Ajax, certainly, is unable to make meaning from his “divine madness,” to fit his former self with
his current self; after the bloodbath, Tecmessa says, he begged her to tell him “how he had come
to be in such condition” (314). This exchange takes place offstage, before the action of the play
has begun, which makes it particularly striking that the first words we hear from Ajax on stage
speak directly to his shattered sense of agency in a world he once felt in control of. “Why me?
Why me?” (333) and then two lines later, “Why me? Why me?” and again, fifty lines later:
“Why me? Why?”
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Ajax’s violently dissociative experience during his slaughtering spree is also, of course,
intertwined with a collapse of his self’s physical cohesion and sense of continuity. Independently
of his conscious mind, his body registers danger and the neural and chemical signals to fight. His
body, in other words, was present, but not his mind, and this rupture of the balance between
psyche and soma, as Boulanger (2007) points out, is a rupture of “the body as psychic container,
capable of establishing an interior object world inhabited by a benign object and capable of
recognizing the separateness of others” (p. 87).
At the same time, Ajax’s sense of continuous selfhood is brutally disrupted: he does not
know what has happened. The text highlights the difference between his state of madness and his
state of sanity, as though they exist in different dimensions of time: “Slowly and painfully he
returned to his senses/And when he saw the carnage under his roof/He grasped his head and
screamed/Crashing down onto the bloody wreckage/Then just sitting in the slaughter, fists
clenched/his nails tearing into his hair” (305-10). During the rampage, time stood still; for both
Ajax and the audience, the experience is frozen intact in time, and cannot be processed into a
narrative of past, present, or future. Indeed there is no “going on being” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 89)
for Ajax in the moment of his traumatic rampage—or after. The Chorus pleads with Ajax to
reclaim continuity: “It happened; nothing can change that now—/But don’t keep suffering the
pain of the past” (377-78). Ajax cannot: “Where could I run? Where could I ever stay? My
reputation now lies here/Among these butchered carcasses” (403-06). His sense of a self that
exists through time, that has a past and a future, has been obliterated, and he is imprisoned in, as
Boulanger puts it, a “meaningless now” (p. 90).
Ajax’s traumatized affect is evident in the disembodied quality that overtakes him during
the massacre. Indeed, as Boulanger notes, it is often the case that “powerful affect triggers the
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dissociative response” (p. 90) and Ajax’s profound feeling of betrayal and rage at his
dishonoring by the Greek leaders, certainly propel his actions. Both during and after the
traumatic slaughtering, it is clear that he has lost the usual range of familiar feelings that ground
his core sense of himself. As the Chorus observes, “The mighty warrior/Ares sent out to
war/Retreats into lonely despair,/Greatly distressing his friends/Everything he reached for/All his
great glories, lost” (611-17). Tecmessa too is shocked by Ajax’s weeping presentation—and his
inability to locate his former self:
I told him what I knew
And he let out such pitiable, mournful cries—
Sounds I had never thought possible from him
He had always thought weeping cowardly,
A sign of weakness in lesser men.
Before, he would never wail or cry
But deeply groan and bellow like a bull.
Now he has been laid low by this evil. (315-21).
As with loss of agency, physical cohesion, and continuity, loss of affect regulation
implies a loss of subjectivity; without an “I,” with nothing but a “self that exists only as an
object,” the “subject who makes choices and follows through on them is lost” (Boulanger, 2007,
p. 81). Perhaps this loss of subjectivity also explains Ajax’s repeated, desperate cry of “Why
me?”, as though in saying me over and over again he might actually come to feel a sense of me.
The inability to register one’s own affect, too control one’s own affect, or to “experience
feelings in a consistent fashion” (p. 93) destroys not only a sense of an “I” but a sense of an other
as well: “With the failure to register one’s own feelings comes both the inability to share one’s
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affective state with an other, and the failure to appreciate the other’s affectivity, which is the
basis of intersubjective experience” (p. 93). In the case of Ajax, we see this rupture between self
and other play out with his wife, Tecmessa, as he urges her to “Get out of my sight! Get
away!/Aiai! Aiai!” (369-70).
But I would argue that this rupture of a capacity for intersubjectivity began earlier, before
the massacre of livestock, which simply compounded it. For Ajax the death of the “good object”
of Achilles, and then Achilles’ second death, symbolized by Ajax’s loss of his armor, is the
tipping point. Sophocles does not describe Ajax’s grief around Achilles’ actual death, but we
can infer how devastating it is from his extreme response to the armor being given to Odysseus.
There is obviously the question of honor and respect—and by extension the brutal negation, the
betrayal of not being honored. But perhaps the significance of the armor for Ajax also lies in its
ability to keep the good object of Achilles, the internalized empathic other, with him; he would
have worn the armor, and like a layer of skin it would have served to preserve physical cohesion,
the integrity of inside and outside, the internal and the external. Without it, Ajax experiences
profound depersonalization, and as Boulanger notes, “[w]hen the significance of external objects
is suddenly voided, the internal object world becomes a void” (p. 99). Empathy for the other—an
ability to hold onto the presence of Achilles or of Tecmessa’s and his son’s love—is unattainable
in this state. The betrayal of the Greek generals—what Ajax emotionally registers as a desire to
destroy him—further corrupts his sense of internalized benign others. He is reduced to the
attacked, reactionary object rather than a reflective subject, and is thus left in Klein’s (1935,
1986) paranoid schizoid position. From this point of view, the slaughtering of the animals, not to
mention the repetition of words like hacking and butchering, can also be read as representations
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of Ajax’s internal landscape, a world filled with persecutory part objects. As Boulanger says of
the paranoid schizoid position brought on by trauma,
In this world, [he] has no subjectivity, no agency, and no sense of history; object
use and mutuality suddenly seem beyond reach, a vague memory of something
lost, while others, who once felt important to [him] now feel like shadows with no
substance of their own. (p. 101)
Ajax is thrust into a state of traumatic aloneness, and indeed, the only thread of hope that
Sophocles holds out for his survival, hinges on interrupting that aloneness, on staying in the
company of his family and friends. The Messenger reports back a prophecy given to Ajax’s half
brother, Teucer: “if he ever wanted to see/Ajax alive again, he must do everything /In his power
to keep him inside today” (773-75). (As a side note, it is astonishing to see that Sophocles, over
two thousand years ago, was already offering a version of the treatment planning around
suicidality that is still in effect today. Again, to draw on my experience as an intern at the VA,
although this is true in any crisis of suicidality, when a veteran voiced suicidality, one of the
most crucial next steps for the mental health workers was to shore up the veteran’s support
system, to counter, in effect, that traumatic aloneness.)
But Ajax, of course, cannot be kept inside. He remains in a state of psychic equivalence,
whereby his self, shattered as it is, can no longer truly reflect, integrate experience, or recognize
others. “In this state,” as Boulanger notes, “the self that acts as mediator between words and
what they stand for, between symbols and symbolized, between immediate and mediated
experience, is no longer accessible” (p. 117). His narrative of experience is lifeless; it is one of
deadened repetition, evinced by both the repeated scenes of the slaughter and by his repeated
narrative of vengeance. Neither has been detoxified in any measure for him because of his state
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of traumatic aloneness. The persecutory part objects that speak to his shattered subjectivity
reappear in the form of the Furies he calls out to moments before he kills himself: “Come,
Furies, to a feast of vengeance—Feed on the whole army; devour them all!” (844-45). He is
calling to them to destroy his enemies, but of course he has not truly projected them outward;
they are introjected inward and it is it is he who is about to be destroyed:
This plain of Troy, you nurtured me,
And now I take my leave of you.
These are the last words of Ajax;
Now he speaks in Hades to the dead. (862-865)
Ajax’s moral injury, his shattered self, his suicidality are appallingly resonant with the
experiences of contemporary service members and veterans. Near the end of the play, Menelaus,
a Greek general observes, “And any man, however great he grows/Can always be felled by the
slightest blow” (1078-79). This, too, is Boulanger’s refrain about the fragility of the self in the
face of massive trauma, and it is the refrain of the New York Times feature story that I mentioned
at the outset of this thesis, which highlighted marine after marine who had been considered to be
a “fearsome team leader” or who had returned to the States and been a tireless supporter for
fellow veterans in trouble, ultimately succumbing to suicide. In the article, one of the soldiers,
Travis Wilkerson, implores the others to maintain solidarity and safety. After the funeral of a
platoon member who had committed suicide, he says to his company buddies, “Real talk, guys,
let’s make a pact, right here . . . I don’t want to go to any more funerals. Let’s promise to reach
out and talk. Get your phones out, put my number in. Call me day or night” (Philipps, 2015).
Two years later Wilkerson shot himself to death.
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Recognizing this breaking point—the basic shatterability of the human self, no matter
how strongly constructed it once was—is the springboard for Boulanger’s adult onset trauma
theory, and is why she sees it as imperative that mental health workers understand the particular
process of catastrophic dissociation in adulthood and the specifics of the ensuing psychic
wreckage. In the same article, one man perfectly describes catastrophic dissociation, albeit in his
own words:
“Something happens over there,” said Mr. Havniear, whose best friend from the
battalion tried suicide by cutting his wrists after returning home, but survived.
“You wake up a primal part of your brain you are not supposed to listen to, and it
becomes a part of you. I shot an old woman. I shot her on purpose because she
was running at us with an RPG. You see someone blown in half, or you carry a
foot. You can try, but it is hard to get away from that.” (Philipps, 2015)
Boulanger argues that without recognizing how this mode of dissociation differs from
developmental trauma, without according value to Lacan’s Real—the severed foot in your
hand—and without finally privileging narrative over interpretation as a pathway to healing,
treatments will dead-end and narratives, like Ajax’s—or Mr. Havniear’s—will remain lifeless.
The subject will not be found.

Strengths and Limitations
Moral injury, as it is currently being constructed, is a complex phenomenon that has
implications for veterans on both a societal and personal level. The combined application of
White’s narrative theory and practice and Boulanger’s adult onset trauma theory offer social
workers a way to attend to both the socio-cultural and psychodynamic components of moral
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injury. As far as I know, this thesis is unique in its application of these two theories to the public
health project, Theater of War, and to the text of Sophocles’ Ajax.
However, there are limitations to this thesis. I have not applied other theoretical
constructs like betrayal trauma theory or emotional processing theory, attachment theory, or
neurobiology, all of which would have offered compelling lenses and provided additional
understanding of the phenomenon of moral injury. My theoretical lenses are also constrained by
the fact that I have looked at them exclusively through their founding authors—Michael White
and Ghislaine Boulanger. Boulanger, as far I can tell, is the only person who is calling her theory
adult onset trauma, and the only one making her particular distinctions about catastrophic
dissociation, but with regard to narrative practice, I have not branched out to include the
theorizing of the many other writers and practitioners who engage in this framework. I have also
chosen to illustrate the social and psychodynamic devastations of moral injury primarily
(although not exclusively) through fictional texts, rather than through first hand oral testimonies.
This thesis is also hampered by my personal limitations, primarily the fact that I am a
civilian and do not have family members or friends who are in the military. I write from a
position of tremendous privilege with regard to veterans and moral injury: my social class, my
race, and my gender have all protected me from war experiences, both in terms of actual
enlistment as well as in terms of social engagement with veteran causes. I did not grasp the
severity of the trauma that veterans experience until a year ago, when I was an intern at the
Department of Veterans Affairs. I have therefore lived many years contributing to moral injury
by my inability to see it in the first place.

Conclusion
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The current moral injury construct is for me, in the end, a signifier of an acute
understanding of the catastrophic trauma of war. It is an important step in increasing the
visibility of war trauma for social workers, for other mental health workers, and for civilians, and
for forcing all of those who have not engaged in our recent wars to look more closely at the
shattering psychological impact of killing other human beings—and to look, as well, at the
shattering psychological impact of not recognizing the shattering psychological impact of killing
other human beings. Betrayal, as moral injury illustrates, can take many forms.
I have no illusion that either narrative practice or adult onset trauma theory offer easy
fixes for something that, ultimately, can never be entirely fixed. But both seem, as I hope I have
demonstrated, to be frameworks that, in their privileging of narrative, fervently wish to restore a
measure of richness and meaning to daily experience, even for those who have been neardecimated by annihilation—theirs or someone else’s. Social workers need to attend to both
components, to work to create more venues for the communalization of war, as Theater of War
does so effectively, as well as to comprehend the depths of psychic shattering that occurs, and
the long, slow work of rebuilding a self through therapy that recognizes the particularities of
adult onset trauma.
“Absorbing, mysterious, of infinite richness, this life,” writes Virginia Woolf in Mrs.
Dalloway (1925). Throughout her novel she holds that sentiment in a dialogic balance with the
equally true observation, made by Septimus Warren Smith, the suicidal combat veteran, that
“human nature is remorseless” (p. 98). Such is the balance that social workers—that all of us—
must reconcile when attending to moral injury. In our interactions with those who are, like
Septimus, continually at risk of feeling “as if some horror had almost come to the surface and
was about to burst into flames” (p. 15), we must stand alongside them as true witnesses to the
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horror that they have experienced, whether that horror has overtaken them from the inside or has
surrounded them from the outside, remembering too that the nature of inside and outside,
personal and communal, in a moral injury context, is porous indeed. We must recognize the
reality of this horror, of this very particular human narrative, and in so doing refuse to leave
anyone behind in the flames.
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